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INTRODUCTION
After decades of confusion, the Supreme Court in a recent series of de-
cisions has begun to bring clarity to the law of regulatory takings.' In doing
so, the Court is bringing to the fore a previously submerged theme in the ju-
risprudence-what this Article calls the equality dimension of regulatory
takings law. This equality dimension paradigmatically asks whether a regu-
Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School. A.B., Harvard University, 1990; J.D.,
Columbia Law School, 1997. The author wishes to thank Ben Barros, Heather Elliott, Mark Fenster,
Vic Fleischer, Clare Huntington, Jerold Kayden, Pierre Schlag, Phil Weiser, Charles Wilkinson, and the
participants in the 2007 Property Works in Progress Conference for helpful discussions and comments
on earlier drafts. George Green, Matthew Lasek, and Charles Swanson provided excellent research as-
sistance.
I Regulatory takings law applies the Fifth Amendment's prohibition that "nor shall private property
be taken for public use without just compensation," U.S. CONST. amend. V, to governmental actions
other than the direct exercise of eminent domain.
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lation has forced "some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."2 Despite the
seeming appeal and near-universal acceptance of this proposition, this Arti-
cle argues that privileging equality in the jurisprudence of regulatory tak-
ings raises serious theoretical and doctrinal problems.
The rise of equality norms is a function of the Court's recent moves to
narrow or eliminate other long-standing aspects of the jurisprudence. For
all of the elaborate apparatus of per se and multifactor ad hoc tests it has
constructed, the Court has drawn on three central approaches to answer the
question of which regulations go "too far" under the Takings Clause.' One
approach has been to consider certain regulations functionally equivalent to
the affirmative exercise of eminent domain, focusing primarily on the
touchstones of tangible interference with physical property and diminution
in the value of property.4 The second approach has been to engage in
means-ends analysis akin to substantive due process review, evaluating the
balance between regulatory goals and individual harm.' And, as noted, the
final approach has been grounded in equality norms, comparing the burden
of the regulation on the challenging party to that imposed on similarly situ-
ated owners.6
As to the first approach, the Court has increasingly diminished the
practical importance of the trope of functional equivalence, almost to the
point of irrelevance. In particular, the Court has rejected conceptual sever-
ance-the idea that the impact of a regulation should be evaluated in light
of the burden it places on a particular "slice" of property or stick in the pro-
verbial bundle of rights.7 In so doing, the Court has made it increasingly
difficult for property owners to bring claims that general regulations operate
as the functional equivalent of a direct exercise of eminent domain, as most
2 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). Equality considerations have long lain be-
neath the surface of underdeveloped questions relating not only to a regulation's overall "fairness," as in
Armstrong, but also to whether regulations are generally applicable, and to the concept of average recip-
rocity of advantage.
3 The phrase is from Justice Holmes's opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
(1922): "[W]hile property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be rec-
ognized as a taking." Id. at 415. Whether Mahon should properly be read as the foundation of modem
regulatory takings has provoked debate. See, e.g., Robert Brauneis, "The Foundation of Our 'Regula-
tory Takings' Jurisprudence": The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes's Opinion in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613, 702 (1996); William Michael Treanor, Jam for Justice Holmes:
Reassessing the Significance of Mahon, 86 GEO. L.J. 813, 861 (1998). As Brauneis points out, however,
the Court regularly invokes Mahon as that foundation. See Brauneis, supra, at 616.
4 See infra Part I.A.
5 See infra Part I.B.
6 See infra Part I.C.
7 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331 (2002);
see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring). For further
discussion of conceptual severance and the "denominator" problem, see infra text accompanying notes
41-42, 157-62.
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regulations leave some or significant value.8 Some claims will no doubt
continue to raise questions of deprivation of all economically beneficial
uses of property, permanent physical occupation, and other unusual inter-
ference with property. In practice, however, such regulatory burdens are
rare.
As to the second approach, the Court has even more directly excised
means-ends analysis from the corpus of regulatory takings. In its recent de-
cision in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,9 the Court held that inquiries into
whether a regulation is justified by legitimate state interests have "no proper
place in our takings jurisprudence."1 In so doing, the Lingle Court untan-
gled regulatory takings jurisprudence from its long and unfortunate embrace
with substantive due process. Together, the muting of functional equiva-
lence and the end of means-ends analysis are bringing the third, equality-
based, approach, increasingly to the fore.II
This emerging equality dimension, which has previously been sub-
merged in practice, enjoys broad scholarly support. As David Dana and
Thomas Merrill note, "[t]he equal treatment justification remains today the
most widespread explanation for the compensation requirement."' 2 Despite
8 See infra Part II.A.
9 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
10 Id. at 548. Lingle involved a challenge to a Hawaii rent-control statute that had been struck down
under a test that asked whether a regulation "substantially advances a legitimate state interest." Id. at
534. The Court first articulated this test in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), and the
proposition that a regulation could be struck down under the Takings Clause on this standard spawned a
quarter-century of confusion. See infra Part I.B.1. Lingle excised the Agins test from the law of takings,
and in the course of doing so provided an unusually lucid exegesis of regulatory takings law, reaffirming
the importance of judicial deference in the review of ordinary economic and social legislation. See
D. Benjamin Barros, At Last, Some Clarity: The Potential Long-Term Impact ofLingle v. Chevron and
the Separation of Takings and Substantive Due Process, 69 ALB. L. REV. 343, 349-56 (2005); J. Peter
Byrne, Due Process Land Use Claims After Lingle, 34 EcOLOGY L.Q. 471, 471 (2007); see also Simon
Lazar & Dwight H. Merriam, Commentary, Ding Dong the Witch is Dead: O'Connor Drops a House on
the Agins Takings Test, 57 PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 3 (2005). For further discussion of Lingle and its larger
impact on takings jurisprudence, see infra Part lI.B.
I This jurisprudential trend is underappreciated in the literature. Although the equality dimension
of regulatory takings is well recognized as a background principle, its potential elevation in the current
jurisprudence has not been a focus of the post-Lingle commentary. See, e.g., Jane B. Baron, Winding
Toward the Heart of the Takings Muddle: Kelo, Lingle, and the Public Discourse About Private Prop-
erty, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 613, 642 (2007) (noting, in passing, that Lingle can be read to focus regula-
tory takings jurisprudence on questions of "fairness and justice" as articulated in Armstrong); Barros,
supra note 10, at 354 n.56; Mark Fenster, The Takings Clause, Version 2005: The Legal Process of
Constitutional Property Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 667, 676-81 (2007). In one exception, as dis-
cussed below, see infra text accompanying notes 110-17, John Echevarria has noted that Lingle rein-
forces the importance to takings law of the generality of a regulation, one theme in the grouping of
equality norms in the jurisprudence. See John D. Echeverria, The Triumph of Justice Stevens and the
Principle of Generality, in THE SUPREME COURT AND TAKINGS: FOUR ESSAYS 22, 24 (Richard 0.
Brooks ed., 2006), available at http://www.vjel.org/books/pdf/PUBS 10003.pdf.
12 DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 33-34 (2002).
HeinOnline  -- 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 3 2008
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
this consensus, the equality dimension of regulatory takings has thin theo-
retical grounding and troubling doctrinal consequences.13
From a theoretical perspective, privileging norms of equality engrafts
political process rationales for heightened judicial scrutiny onto a "minor-
ity" defined only by the differential burden of a regulation. In other words,
identifying a group of property owners for the purpose of asserting political
process failure solely by differential effects on their property interests is
plain circularity. This is a kind of conceptual severance based on the distri-
bution of burdens across a community-preempting the political process for
determining such distribution-and is as unjustified as are the attempts to
sever physical and temporal aspects of property that the Court has now re-
jected.
Equally troubling is the resulting political economy of the jurispru-
dence. Under an equality approach, regulatory takings claims become more
salient when there is more property to protect. A robust equality dimension
in regulatory takings thus provides the greatest judicial protection to the
parties who least need it. Although no rigorous analysis of the distribution
of regulatory takings claims has been undertaken, even a cursory glance at
the plaintiffs in the leading regulatory takings cases evinces a pattern.
Unlike in the many contexts where direct eminent domain has been impor-
tant-where there is a history of burdening the disenfranchised 4 -the Tak-
13 These problems have received essentially no scholarly attention. Indeed, some scholars have ar-
gued that the equality dimension of regulatory takings deserves greater emphasis. See Baron, supra note
11, at 651; Paul J. Boudreaux, The Quintessential Best Case for "Takings" Compensation-A Pragmatic
Approach to Identifying the Elements of Land-Use Regulations that Present the Best Case for Govern-
ment Compensation, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 193, 223-41 (1997); Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distribu-
tive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741, 778-92 (1999); John E. Fee, The Takings Clause as a Comparative
Right, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1049-60 (2004); see also Jeffrey M. Gaba, Taking "Justice and Fair-
ness" Seriously: Distributive Justice and the Takings Clause, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 569, 576-83
(2007); Note, The Principle of Equality in Takings Clause Jurisprudence, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1030
(1996). Other scholars have also drawn on aspects of the equality dimension for discussions of particu-
lar aspects of takings. See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball & Laurie Reynolds, Exactions and Burden Distribution
in Takings Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1513, 1570-84 (2006) (using burden-distribution concerns to
propose a reformulation of exaction doctrine); Carlos Ball, The Curious Intersection of Nuisance and
Takings Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 819, 851-68 (2006) (analyzing the distribution of burdens when the gov-
emnment acts in a nuisance-like manner). And an earlier generation of takings scholarship laid the con-
ceptual groundwork for equality norms in the contemporary jurisprudence. See Frank Michelman,
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation " Law, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Joseph Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 64-65 (1964)
[hereinafter Sax, Police Power] (discussing the problem of what Sax described as governmental dis-
crimination-the Takings Clause as a restraint against selecting otherwise similarly situated owners
upon whom a generalized burden might fall). To date, however, problems posed by the contemporary
emergence of equality norms in the law of takings have gone unnoted in the literature.
14 See J. Peter Byrne, Condemnation of Low Income Residential Communities Under the Takings
Clause, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 131, 150-57 (2005); Wendell Pritchett, The "Public Menace"
of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1
(2003).
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ings Clause has often been invoked to challenge regulation by parties armed
with the resources and capacity to engage in the political process.
Finally, from a doctrinal perspective, privileging equality norms
threatens to warp the fabric of both takings and equal protection. An open-
ended inquiry into the purported fairness of the distribution of a regulation's
burdens is entirely without independent content. Any non-political-process-
based theory of equality under the Takings Clause will devolve ultimately
into a question of the rationality of legislative or regulatory line-drawing, an
inquiry that stands at odds with the core of takings jurisprudence. More-
over, the more vigorous a freestanding equality inquiry under the Takings
Clause, the more reified the legal system's accounting of any regulation's
adjustment of the "benefits and burdens of economic life"15 becomes, and
the more challenging it becomes to respond to inequality or other genuine
common exigencies.
Accordingly, this Article argues that concerns animating the equality
dimension should not sound under the Takings Clause, but rather under the
Equal Protection Clause, with its deferential standard for the review of or-
dinary economic and social regulation. Use of the Takings Clause as a ve-
hicle to subject regulations to review that is less deferential than the general
standards that have prevailed since the end of the Lochner era has long
posed an anomaly in constitutional jurisprudence.16 The Lingle Court ex-
plicitly rejected such heightened scrutiny in its quasi-substantive-due-
process guise, but the same disparity may now return in the guise of equal-
ity.
This Article, in sum, seeks to make two contributions to the literature.
As a descriptive matter, it identifies the emerging equality dimension in
regulatory takings law. As a normative matter, it sounds a note of warning
about this development. Lingle resolved a generation of confusion over the
interaction between substantive due process and takings. It would be unfor-
tunate if courts, litigants, and scholars had to suffer through another genera-
tion of similar confusion over the interaction between takings and equal
protection. Situating the equality dimension of regulatory takings law
within the overall domain of equal protection jurisprudence would appro-
priately leave the Takings Clause as a guard against only those rare regula-
tory actions that are the functional equivalent of direct expropriation. By so
doing, the Court would return the judicial review of most regulation to its
proper constitutional home and continue to clarify one of the most muddled
yet important areas of constitutional law.
15 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
16 Cf Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and Its Impact on Eco-
nomic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. REV. 605 (1996) (discussing contemporary takings jurisprudence in com-
parison to other avenues of federal constitutional protection of property in light of the approach of the
Court in the Lochner era).
102:1 (2008)
HeinOnline  -- 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 5 2008
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I distills three primary ap-
proaches to regulatory takings from the patchwork of tests and concerns
that have animated the jurisprudence. These approaches are the following:
regulatory takings as the functional equivalent of direct expropriation,
means-ends analysis, and equality norms. Part II analyzes recent trends that
are reordering this area of law: the increasing irrelevance of the functional
equivalence theme and Lingle's explicit rejection of means-ends analysis.
As Part II argues, these developments are bringing the equality dimension
of regulatory takings law increasingly to the fore. Part III then examines
the significant theoretical and doctrinal problems posed by the rise of equal-
ity norms, proposing that such norms instead be situated in the realm of
equal protection. The resulting jurisprudence of regulatory takings would
be simpler, clearer, and ultimately more egalitarian.
I. THREE THEMES iN REGULATORY TAKINGS
The literature on regulatory takings tends to vacillate between high
theory and doctrinal taxonomy. From a theoretical perspective, regulatory
takings can often seem to be the great blank canvas of constitutional law.
This is perhaps unavoidable, given that reviewing regulation under the Tak-
ings Clause requires a body of law for which constitutional text provides
essentially no guidance, 7 and history provides little more-except, as the
Court has acknowledged, to support the proposition that the Takings Clause
in its original conception was unlikely to have applied to regulatory re-
view." Onto this blank canvas, scholars have painted justifications for
regulatory takings jurisprudence that implicate fundamental questions of ef-
ficiency, justice, and the underlying interplay between private property and
the state.1 9
From a doctrinal perspective, the Court's approach to regulatory tak-
ings represents an uneasy accretion of convoluted tests and analytical vari-
17 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321-22 &
n. 17 (2002).
18 See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Politi-
cal Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 783 (1995); see also John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its
Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1252 (1996).
19 The Court's long-muddled regulatory takings jurisprudence has inspired scholars to propose a
great many organizing principles that might fruitfully lend coherence-or at least defensible justifica-
tion-to the doctrine. For some of the more influential examples, see, for example, BRUCE ACKERMAN,
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY
TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS (1995); Michelman, supra note 13; Jed Rubenfeld, Usings,
102 YALE L.J. 1077 (1993); Sax, Police Power, supra note 13; Joseph Sax, Takings, Private Property
and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971) [hereinafter Sax, Private Property]. See generally JESSE
DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 1059-65 (6th ed. 2006).
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ables.2° The Court has recognized a handful of claims to which some form
of per se liability or heightened scrutiny clearly applies.2' Outside of these
"relatively narrow" categories,22 as the Lingle Court described them, most
regulatory takings claims fall under the "ad hoc," multifactor analysis that
the Court first articulated in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York. 23
There is a strong meta-signal in the Court's endorsement of Penn Cen-
tral as the lodestar of regulatory takings jurisprudence, with its concomitant
rejection of rule-based limits on the government's ability to redefine prop-
erty rights. 24 Privileging ad hoc, open-ended analysis commits the Court-
to the consternation of some commentators 25-to unfolding the doctrine in a
20 See Dale A. Whitman, Deconstructing Lingle: Implications for Takings Doctrine,
40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 573, 574-78 (2007) (discussing the "vexing" state of regulatory takings law).
21 See Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and the Conse-
quences of Clarity, 92 CAL. L. REV. 609, 617-19 (2004) (identifying "claims alleging physical appro-
priation, physical invasion, or regulations that deprive an owner of all economically beneficial use of
land" as types of takings claims subjected to heightened scrutiny). The Court has recognized two cate-
gories of purportedly "per se" liability in regulatory takings. The first involves claims against regula-
tions that authorize a permanent physical occupation of property. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV, 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982). The second involves claims against regulations that deprive an owner
of all economically viable use of property. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
A form of heightened scrutiny likewise applies to the review of certain types of "exactions" under Nol-
lan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 830 (1987) and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374, 385 (1994). Exactions occur when governmental entities require concessions from property owners
in exchange for certain discretionary governmental actions. See generally Ball & Reynolds, supra note
13 (arguing that, to be consistent with the Takings Clause, the constitutional standard applied to exac-
tions should be changed to better account for the burden distribution); Mark Fenster, Regulating Land
Use in a Constitutional Shadow: The Institutional Contexts of Exactions, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 729 (2007)
[hereinafter Fenster, Exactions] (examining exactions before and after a series of Supreme Court cases
in 2005).
22 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005).
23 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). The Penn Central analysis involves a series of "essentially ad hoc,
factual inquiries," yielding "several factors that have particular significance. The economic impact of
the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations. So, too, is the character
of the governmental action." Id. These factors-two as Justice Brennan described them, but articulated
now as three-are well recognized as the Penn Central test. See Gary Lawson, Katherine Ferguson &
Guillermo A. Montero, "Oh Lord, Please Don't Let Me Be Misunderstood! ": Rediscovering the
Mathews v. Eldridge and Penn Central Frameworks, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 37-45 (2005). The
Penn Central analysis, however, can encompass all "relevant" circumstances. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres.
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002); see also Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring). As Eric Claeys has noted, Penn Central is
less of a strict "test" and more of a frame for approaching the broad questions inherent in regulatory tak-
ings. See Eric R. Claeys, The Penn Central Test and Tensions in Liberal Property Theory, 30 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 339, 343 (2006).
24 Cf Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 915-34
(2000) (analyzing the Court's various visions of property for constitutional purposes).
25 See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1697 (1988) (arguing that "ad hocery" is particularly inappropriate in the takings area "because of
the important role of investment-backed expectations").
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pragmatic common law manner. 6 The Court's embrace of Justice Bren-
nan's jurisprudential shrug of the shoulders in Penn Central does not quite
amount to Justice Stewart's famous I-know-it-when-I-see-it standard,27 but
it certainly comes close.2"
Taking an approach, then, at a midpoint between the broad theory and
the technical details of the doctrine, it is possible to distill three essential
"common touchstone[s]"29 that have emerged from this common-law-like
jurisprudence. Broadly speaking, these themes approach the Takings
Clause as a limit on regulations that are the functional equivalent of direct
governmental expropriation (functional equivalence); that are not justified
when public good is balanced against private harm (means-ends analysis);
or that concentrate burdens too narrowly or otherwise violate norms of dis-
tributional fairness (equality).3"
A. Functional Equivalence to Direct Expropriation
To begin with the oldest theme in the jurisprudence, one approach to
regulatory takings is to treat certain governmental actions that do not in-
volve the direct eminent domain power as functionally equivalent to those
involving such power. This theme focuses on tangible interference with
physical property as well as diminution in the value of property.
26 Cf David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 884-
88 (1996) (describing constitutional interpretation grounded not in a search for an overriding authorita-
tive source but rather in understandings that evolve over time through decisions in a common law mold).
For arguments in favor of pragmatic explication of regulatory takings doctrine over comprehensive theo-
ries, see, for example, Jeanne L. Schroeder, Never Jam To-day: On the Impossibility of Takings Juris-
prudence, 84 GEO. L.J. 1531 (1996) (grounding a defense of pragmatism in takings jurisprudence in
Hegelian conceptions of freedom and property); David A. Westbrook, Administrative Takings: A Realist
Perspective on the Practice and Theory of Regulatory Takings Cases, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 717,
719-20 (1999) (suggesting that a "comprehensive view" of takings is unworkable due to the many as-
pects of government power implicated by the Takings Clause, and arguing for the adoption of a more
pragmatic approach). See also Mark R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24
CARDOZO L. REV. 93 (2002) (arguing that vagueness in takings doctrine best supports pragmatic renego-
tiation of social conceptions of the limits of property rights).
27 See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
28 See John D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 171, 173
(2005) (discussing the ascendancy of Penn Central); Laura S. Underkuffler, Tahoe's Requiem: The
Death of the Scalian View of Property and Justice, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 727 (2004) (discussing the
collapse of rule-based, immutable approaches to regulatory takings in favor of Penn Central's ad hoc
approach). The Court's now-predominant approach to regulatory takings is methodologically similar to
its incremental approach to federalism doctrine, another area of constitutional law where history and text
provide relatively little guidance. See Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institu-
tional Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733, 1756 (2005) (argu-
ing in the context of the Court's federalism doctrine for courts to "proceed by moving the law in
increments rather than by seeking to impose (or restore) a broad constitutional vision").
29 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538-40 (2005).
30 See id.
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1. Functional Equivalence in the Jurisprudence.-The Takings
Clause has long applied to regulations that, without actually transferring ti-
tle, involve governmental actions that destroy property or physically oust an
owner, or authorize similar forms of physical interference with tangible
property. 1 This theme first emerged in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-
century cases involving ouster from land through flooding and similar
events. 2 These cases invoked the requirement of compensation on the the-
ory that such physical interference was functionally the same to an owner as
direct expropriation. Thus began the decoupling of takings law from the af-
firmative exercise of the government's power of eminent domain.3
As conceptions of property began to develop in more abstract direc-
tions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the theme of func-
tional equivalence likewise transformed. No longer could dry formalism
provide meaningful guidance in light of broad transformations in the rela-
tionship between the state and property.34 As commentators have noted,
many of the most difficult puzzles of contemporary takings law arose from
shifts in conceptions of property that coincided with the rise of the modem
regulatory state. 5
31 Requiring compensation for governmental actions that destroy property or oust an owner was a
relatively modest step away from the affirmative exercise of the power of eminent domain, and remains
the conceptually easiest strand of the doctrine tojustify.
32 See, e.g., W. Union Tel. Co. v. Penn. R.R. Co., 195 U.S. 540, 562 (1904) (holding that maintain-
ing telegraph equipment on the right of way of a railroad constituted a taking); see St. Louis v. W. Union
Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92, 101-02 (1893) (holding that the physical invasion of municipally owned streets
by telegraph poles constituted a taking); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 181 (1872)
("[W]here real estate is actually invaded by superinduced additions of water, earth, sand, or other mate-
rial, or by having any artificial structure placed on it, so as to effectually destroy or impair its usefulness,
it is a taking, within the meaning of the Constitution."); Treanor, supra note 18, at 792, 794-97 (discuss-
ing the few Supreme Court cases prior to 1870 that interpreted the Takings Clause). There was a rela-
tive dearth of cases in the nineteenth century interpreting federal eminent domain law, in part because of
the state of the Court's Fourteenth Amendment incorporation doctrine at the time and in part because of
practicalities that channeled cases to the states and to Congress under the Tucker Act. See Treanor, su-
pra note 18, at 794 & n.69.
33 See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS
OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 148 (1992). State constitutional and common law approaches to compensation
requirements had recognized this limited form of "regulatory" taking long before the Supreme Court
weighed in. See Treanor, supra note 18, at 792.
34 The formalism associated with the nineteenth-century Court's approach to the compensation
question, which Joseph Sax identified with the first Justice Harlan, see Sax, Police Power, supra note
13, at 38-40, was increasingly challenged by the rising pervasiveness of economic and social legislation
at the end of that century and in the first decades of the twentieth century. Id. at 40-41. Justice
Holmes's ascendancy on the Court coincided with these pressures and with shifts in general conceptions
of property. Id. at 40.
35 See HORWITZ, supra note 33, at 146-48; Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nine-
teenth Century: The Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REv. 325, 328-30
(1980).
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This transformation, along with most themes in the modem jurispru-
dence, is reflected in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon.36 There, Justice Holmes
stated that one consideration in determining when an exercise of the police
power transgresses limits imposed by the Constitution's compensation re-
quirement "is the extent of the diminution [in property value]. When it
reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not all cases there must be an exer-
cise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act."37 This state-
ment, coupled with Justice Holmes's comment that the dividing line
between permissible and impermissible regulation "is a question of de-
gree,"3 has lead to a reading of Mahon's "too far" admonition as a thresh-
old test.39 Under this reading, certain types of interference with property
rights are sufficiently individually injurious that, standing alone, they con-
stitute a taking.
Justice Holmes, however, was not entirely consistent in his approach in
Mahon. Traces remained of the earlier, physicalist-oriented view of regula-
tory takings as the functional equivalent of direct expropriation. Thus,
when Holmes asserted that requiring a coal company to keep a column of
coal in place has "very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as
appropriating or destroying it," 4 he was harkening back to the flooding and
similar cases grounded in tangible interference with physical property. Jus-
tice Brandeis, in dissent, chastised Holmes for ignoring the larger property
interests held by the coal companies 4-thus spawning the long-vexing "de-
nominator problem"42-but the conceptual frame endured.
36 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
37 Id. at 415. The obverse of this observation, as noted in Lingle among other cases, is Justice
Holmes's recognition that "'[g]ovemment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to prop-
erty could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law."' See Lingle v.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005) (quoting Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413).
38 Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416.
39 See Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L.
REv. 561, 565-66 (1984). "Degree" could mean a taking is unjustified in light of a balancing of private
harm against public benefit, but it can also be read as focusing solely (or primarily) on some threshold of
economic injury beyond which compensation is required.
40 Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414.
41 Id. at 419 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
42 The "denominator problem" refers to the dilemma that evaluating the impact of a regulation re-
quires delineation of the relevant "parcel" affected by that regulation. In Mahon, for example, Justice
Holmes singled out the coal that the Kohler Act required to be kept in place, while Justice Brandeis fo-
cused on the entire interest of the coal companies in the coal removed as well as that left in place. These
approaches thus involved entirely different "denominators" against which to measure the numerator of
the regulation's impact.
This dilemma resurfaced in Penn Central, a case that involved the historic landmark designation of
Grand Central Terminal. The regulation required approval for development planned above the Terminal
and when proposed designs were not approved, Penn Central Transportation Company, the owner of the
Terminal, challenged the denial under the Takings Clause. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 115 (1978). In rejecting the takings claim, Justice Brennan defined the denominator as
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Echoes from Mahon reverberate in Penn Central's modem reformula-
tion of the jurisprudence, as do most themes in regulatory takings.43 The
functional equivalence theme returned in Penn Central's "character of gov-
ernmental action" inquiry, which focused on physical interference with
property as an indicator of types of regulations more likely to require com-
pensation.' Likewise, diminution in value reemerged in the first two ele-
ments of the Penn Central analysis: economic impact and interference with
distinct investment-backed expectations.4" Although Justice Brennan
clearly envisioned the ad hoc analysis he was articulating to embrace more
than individual harm alone, some commentators and lower courts have
fixed on these elements as critical, if not determinative.46
The functional equivalence theme, finally, finds its clearest modem
form in the two "per se" categories of liability. The theme resurfaced as a
primary justification for the rule articulated in Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp. that a regulation authorizing permanent physical
occupation by a private entity constitutes a per se taking.47
the city tax block designated as the landmark site, against an argument that the denominator should have
been defined as the envelope of restricted air rights. Id. at 129-31; see infra note 158.
43 See Jerold S. Kayden, Celebrating Penn Central, PLANNING, June 2003, at 20 (discussing Penn
Central as the touchstone of modem regulatory takings law).
44 As Justice Brennan stated, a "'taking' may more readily be found when the interference with
property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from
some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good."
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
45 Id.
46 Some courts, for example, have found that the Penn Central analysis can be resolved on the basis
of interference with investment-backed expectations alone. See, e.g., Golden Pac. Bancorp v. United
States, 15 F.3d 1066, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("[W]e need only focus upon the third of the [Penn Central]
factors[:] ... interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations."); see also Good v. United
States, 39 Fed. Cl. 81, 108-13 & n.48 (1997) (resolving a claim primarily on the failure of expectation
after cursorily considering other Penn Central factors); State Dep't of Health v. The Mill, 887 P.2d 993,
1000 (Colo. 1994) ("The 'reasonable investment-backed expectations' of the regulated party is the dis-
positive factor in takings analysis when the regulated party is 'on notice' of the extent of the govern-
ment's regulatory authority over its property."). In Palazzolo, the Supreme Court rejected the
proposition that notice alone can be dispositive to bar a regulatory takings claim by undermining reason-
able investment-backed expectations, and suggested that this aspect of the Penn Central test should not
be dispositive more generally. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 634 (2001) ("The [lower]
court erred in elevating what it believed to be '[petitioner's] lack of reasonable investment-backed ex-
pectations' to 'dispositive' status. Investment-backed expectations, though important, are not talismanic
under Penn Central. Evaluation of the degree of interference with investment-backed expectations in-
stead is one factor that points toward the answer to the question whether the application of a particular
regulation to particular property 'goes too far."' (citations omitted)); Steven J. Eagle, The Rise and Rise
of "Investment-Backed Expectations," 32 URB. LAw. 437, 437 (2000) ("[A] determination that there
were investment-backed expectations is becoming necessary for a takings plaintiff to prevail.").
47 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982). Loretto involved a challenge to a New York law that required land-
lords to permit the installation of cable facilities on rental property. Id. at 421-25.
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A similar sentiment is reflected in the justification that Justice Scalia
gave in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council48 for a per se approach to
regulations that deny an owner all economically beneficial uses of prop-
erty.49 Given Lucas's singular focus on the rights of property holders to the
exclusion of any evaluation of governmental interest, some commentators
read the case to define functional equivalence as a threshold question of in-
dividual harm. °
The physicalist strain of the functional equivalence theme underlying
Loretto is likewise evident in cases involving interference with clearly de-
marcated physical property rights5 or instances where a regulation imposes
physical access requirements. 2 This strain is also what the Court seems to
have been contemplating in cases finding takings where regulations have
impacted specific-but constitutionally siguificant--"stick " in the prover-
bial property-rights bundle.53
2. Functional Equivalence in Theoretical Perspective.-Justifi-
cations for viewing regulatory takings as the functional equivalent of tradi-
tional eminent domain reflect several important theoretical frames. 4 Ex-
48 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
49 See id. at 1017 ("Perhaps it is simply, as Justice Brennan suggested, that total deprivation of
beneficial use is, from the landowner's point of view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation." (citing
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 652 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting))).
50 See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Police Power Revisited: Phantom Incorporation and the
Roots of the Takings "Muddle, " 90 MINN. L. REv. 826, 887 & n.296 (2006) (discussing Lucas as a
diminution-in-value analysis devoid of consideration of governmental interests).
51 For example, the government overflights that the Court found to constitute a taking in United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946). See id. at 261 ("If, by reason of the frequency and altitude
of the flights, respondents could not use this land for any purpose, their loss would be complete. It
would be as complete as if the United States had entered upon the surface of the land and taken exclu-
sive possession of it.").
52 For example, the navigational servitude found to constitute a taking in Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 178-80 (1979). See id. at 180 ("[T]he imposition of the navigational servitude in
this context will result in an actual physical invasion of the privately owned marina."). Moreover, al-
though the Court's application of regulatory takings concepts to purely fiscal deprivations has been par-
ticularly inconsistent, a physicalist notion of property seems to have been the foundation for the Court's
holding in Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U.S. 156 (1998), that interest on lawyers' trust
account funds could be subject to the Takings Clause. Id. at 172.
53 See, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 717-18 (1987) (holding that a provision of the Indian
Land Consolidation Act that mandated the escheat of certain fractional interests in Indian land consti-
tuted a taking); see also Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234, 244-45 (1997). The Court has at other times
found complete regulation of specific use rights acceptable under the Takings Clause. See, e.g., Andrus
v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 64-68 (1979) (rejecting a regulatory takings challenge to statutes that barred the
sale of lawfully acquired avian artifacts).
54 Certainly, on a visceral level, the kinds of permanent, tangible harms that tend to resonate in this
theme are closest to the direct exercise of eminent domain. It is not surprising, then, that paradigmatic
examples of regulatory takings as being equivalent to the direct exercise of eminent domain hew most
closely to the original function of the Takings Clause. See generally Treanor, supra note 18, at 785-97.
Equivalence also reflects certain aspects of personhood perspectives on property. See Margaret Jane
Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957 (1982). Extreme interference with property
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tending protection from uncompensated interference with property rights
beyond the traditional core of actual appropriation resonates strongly with
classical Lockean-liberal conceptions of the fundamentality of property.5
Underlying this view are utilitarian justifications for protecting owners' ex-
pectations of the fullest extent of property possession, use, and disposition,56
and also the position that uncompensated diminution in value from regula-
tion conflicts with the labor-reward justification for property. 7 Eric Claeys,
in a similar vein, has argued that strong protections for property found in
the modem doctrine-when such protections are actually found-reflect a
premodern commitment to the right to use property grounded in concep-
tions of inherent moral freedom."
Functional equivalence is also important to some justifications for
regulatory takings law that emphasize efficiency aspects of the compensa-
tion requirement. One common argument is that compensation-whether
in direct eminent domain or for the economic impact of regulation-forces
the government to internalize the costs of its actions. 9 Absent a vigorous
regulatory takings doctrine, the argument goes, governmental actors will
tend to overregulate, leading to an inefficient allocation of resources." This
through regulation, the argument follows, is as injurious to the function of property to enhance human
development and identity as any taking of property, compounded by the additional harm from the ab-
sence of compensation. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents
in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1687-88 (1988) [hereinafter Radin, Liberal
Conception].
55 See Radin, Liberal Conception, supra note 54, at 1677-78 (noting that conceptual severance cre-
ates a "slippery slope" wherein "regulation of any portion of an owner's 'bundle of sticks[]' is a taking
of the whole of that particular portion considered separately").
56 See id. at 1668. The modem, libertarian articulation of this perspective is most closely associated
with Richard Epstein. See EPSTEIN, supra note 19. Epstein's view of regulatory takings-that any reas-
signment of property rights must produce net social gains and must be distributed pro rata-rejects most
distinctions between compensation for regulatory action and for direct eminent domain. See id. at 100-
04 (arguing that any regulation of the "possession, use, and disposition of private property" amounts to a
taking).
57 See EPSTEIN, supra note 19, at 15; see also James S. Burling, Private Property Rights & the En-
vironment After Palazzolo, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (2002) ("[U]nder the Lockean theory of
government, which underpins our Constitution, property is an individual right derived from the labor of
individuals.").
58 See Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV.
1549, 1553-55 (2003). For Claeys, modem applications of Penn Central that reflect libertarian senti-
ments reflect an eighteenth- and nineteenth-century conception of property's zone of freedom. See
Claeys, supra note 23, at 350-53.
59 See DANA & MERRILL, supra note 12, at 41-42.
60 Id. at 42 (citing Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of
Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997, 999 (1999)). This incentive-based argument has been criticized as
failing to recognize the difference between the motivation of public actors as opposed to private firms
and individuals. See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation
of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 346-48 (2000). It remains, however, influential. See
DANA & MERRILL, supra note 12, at 41.
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proposition-the so-called fiscal illusion 6 -reflects functional equivalence
in that no distinction is drawn between the incentive structure of a govem-
mental decision to utilize eminent domain as opposed to a decision to regu-
late in a way that diminishes the value of property. Compensation should
be granted-or denied-on the same metric in either situation.62
B. Means-Ends Analysis
Although now rejected by the Supreme Court in Lingle,63 the second
primary approach to regulatory takings law long reflected a strong inter-
twining with due process means-ends analysis. Since at least as early as
Justice Holmes's opinion in Mahon, substantive due process and regulatory
takings have been intimately linked. As Bradley Karkkainen has concluded,
"it fairly may be said that every major element in the Court's modem Fifth
Amendment regulatory takings jurisprudence; with the possible exception
of Loretto, was founded in whole or in part on Fourteenth Amendment sub-
stantive due process precedents, and reflects substantive due process con-
cepts and principles."'
1. Tracing the Entanglement of Due Process and Takings.-From a
doctrinal perspective, the "means-ends" theme can be traced to an alterna-
tive reading of Mahon: that a regulation goes "too far" if the private harm
involved outweighs the public interest." That theme resonates, however,
throughout much of the modem development of the jurisprudence.66
61 See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 149
(3d ed. 2005).
62 Cf FISCHEL, supra note 19, at 201 (discussing economic arguments in the takings context that
apply equally to direct eminent domain and regulatory takings).
63 See infra Part lI.B.
64 Karkkainen, supra note 50, at 888; see also John D. Echeverria & Sharon Dennis, The Takings
Issue and the Due Process Clause: A Way Out of a Doctrinal Confusion, 17 VT. L. REV. 695 (1993) (ar-
guing that the Takings Clause should apply only to physical appropriations of property and that regula-
tions that are unduly oppressive should be challenged under Due Process).
65 See Treanor, supra note 3, at 857 (discussing Mahon as a balancing test); see also FRED
BOSSELMAN ET AL., THE TAKING ISSuE 238 (1973) ("[L]and use regulations must be tested by balancing
the value of the regulation against the loss in value to each affected property owner."), quoted in Brau-
neis, supra note 3, at 617 n.17. This view of Mahon springs from Justice Holmes's discussion (and dis-
missal) of the public purposes of the Kohler Act. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)
("The greatest weight is given to the judgment of the legislature, but it is always open to interested par-
ties to contend that the legislature has gone beyond its constitutional power."); see also id. ("This is the
case of a single private house.").
66 The balancing of public interest and private harm has a categorical counterpoint in the early po-
lice power cases that rejected takings claims on the rationale that legislative determinations of public
harm obviated the need for compensation, even in instances of extremely significant interference with
individual property rights. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (finding that a law
barring a brick mill in a residential area did not constitute a taking); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S.
678 (1888) (finding that laws prohibiting the manufacture and sale of adulterated or imitation milk or
butter were within the police power of the state); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (finding no
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Whether Mahon is best understood as a species of substantive due
process or as Justice Holmes's attempt to strike new ground under the Tak-
ings Clause remains controversial.67 Regardless, precedents from the realm
of substantive due process clearly played a role in Penn Central's modem
formulation of regulatory takings doctrine.68 Drawing on two land-use
cases-Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead69 and Nectow v. City of Cam-
bridge7 -- Justice Brennan stated in Penn Central that "a use restriction on
real property may constitute a 'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the ef-
fectuation of a substantial public purpose."'"
This means-ends analysis was not dispositive in Penn Central, but the
Court's melding of due process and takings precedents continued to prove
influential. The means-end theme is reflected, for example, in the approach
to determining the strength of public purposes that has informed applica-
tions of Penn Central.72 Some lower courts have applied the "character of
governmental action" prong of the Penn Central analysis in particular to
balance public benefit and private harm.73
taking for a law that had the effect of shutting down a brewery). Although the Court in Lucas rejected a
harm/benefit distinction as allowing per se nonliability for takings claims, see Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1021-26 (1992), it articulated an exception to per se liability for limitations on
property that "inhere in the title." Id. at 1029. This exception incorporates some version of the state's
traditional power to limit property rights without compensation.
67 Compare, e.g., Karkkainen, supra note 50, at 873-74 ("Mahon did not hold that a valid police
power regulation was a compensable Fifth Amendment taking if it 'went too far.' Instead, it used a bal-
ancing test to plumb the outer bounds of the police power itself ... , a classic substantive due process
inquiry."), with D. Benjamin Barros, The Police Power and the Takings Clause, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV.
471, 507-09 (2004) (discussing Mahon as a Just Compensation Clause case rather than a substantive due
process case).
68 See Echeverria & Dennis, supra note 64, at 699-700. Bradley Karkkainen traces the modem
view of Fifth Amendment incorporation to Penn Central, and the turn in the decision from due process
to takings. Karkkainen, supra note 50, at 875-78.
69 369 U.S. 590 (1962). Goldblatt involved a challenge to a municipal ordinance regulating sand
and gravel dredging and pit excavating. Id. at 590. The effect of the ordinance was to put the operators
of a sand and gravel pit out of business, and the owners sued, claiming the ordinance "takes their prop-
erty without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 591. The Goldblatt
Court reviewed (and upheld) the ordinance under the Due Process Clause, but in passing also dismissed
the suggestion that the harm suffered by the owners was potentially a taking under Mahon, noting that
"there is no evidence in the present record which even remotely suggests that prohibition of further min-
ing will reduce the value of the lot in question." Id. at 594.
70 277 U.S. 183 (1928). In Nectow, the Court struck down an aspect of the Cambridge, Massachu-
setts zoning code. See id. at 188-89.
71 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978).
72 While Justice Brennan did not use "balancing" in describing his multifactor analysis in Penn
Central and commentators have noted the incommensurability of the factors to be "balanced," see, e.g.,
Karkkainen, supra note 50, at 828, it is not uncommon to see the Penn Central analysis described as a
balancing test. See, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716-17 n.2 (1987).
73 See, e.g., Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1176 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (describ-
ing the character prong as requiring "a reviewing court [to] consider the purpose and importance of the
public interest reflected in the regulatory imposition"); see also R.S. Radford, The "Substantial Ad-
vancement" Test and the Supreme Court's Regulatory Takings Doctrine (ALI-ABA Course of Study,
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Two years after Penn Central, the Court again reached for due process
precedents in Agins v. City of Tiburon.74  In Agins, the Court drew on due
process to articulate-in dicta-an independent frame of analysis in regula-
tory takings law.75 Again citing Nectow, a classic substantive due process
case,76 the Court stated that the "application of a general zoning law to a
particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially
advance legitimate state interests.
77
In practical terms, the Agins test had several consequences. First, the
"substantially advances" language provided support for the exaction-review
concept the Court began to expound in Nollan v. California Coastal Com-
mission-the means-ends proposition that there must be some "essential
nexus" between an exaction and the public purpose advanced by the exac-
tion. Second, the language formed the rhetorical basis for the suggestion
in Nollan that Takings Clause-based review of the impact of regulation on
property rights should be undertaken through some form of heightened
scrutiny. Nollan cited Agins for the argument that the phrasing "substan-
tially advances" implies a tighter means-ends fit than rational basis review
under either the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause.79
Apr. 22-24, 2004), WL SJ052 ALI-ABA 341, 351 n.44 (citing commentary arguing that Penn Central's
"character" prong gave rise to the means-ends dicta in Agins).
74 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
75 Agins involved a challenge by property owners in Tiburon, a part of Marin County north of San
Francisco, to a rezoning that achieved certain open-space goals that, the plaintiffs alleged, Tiburon had
attempted but failed to do through direct condemnation. Agins, 447 U.S. at 257 & n.l.
76 Nectow drew its standard of analysis from the case that first affirmed comprehensive zoning, Vil-
lage of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S.
183, 188 (1928) ("The governmental power to interfere by zoning regulations with the general rights of
the land owner by restricting the character of his use, is not unlimited, and other questions aside, such
restriction cannot be imposed if it does not bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals,
or general welfare." (citing Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395)). Euclid, as it came before the Court, was styled as
both a due process and an equal protection case. 272 U.S. at 384 ("The ordinance is assailed on the
grounds that it is in derogation of [Section] 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution
in that it deprives appellee of liberty and property without due process of law and denies it the equal pro-
tection of the law."). The trial court in Euclid had analyzed the case in part as a takings issue. See Am-
bler Realty Co. v. Vill. of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 317 (D. Ohio 1924) ("[T]he ordinance involved... takes
plaintiff's property, if not for private, at least for public, use, without just compensation .... "); id. at
311-12 (discussing Mahon). But the Supreme Court did not follow suit.
77 Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
78 See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987).
79 See id. at 834 n.3 ("[O]ur opinions do not establish that these standards are the same as those ap-
plied to due process or equal protection claims. To the contrary, our verbal formulations in the takings
field have generally been quite different. We have required that the regulation 'substantially advance'
the 'legitimate state interest' sought to be achieved, not that 'the State "could rationally have decided'
that the measure adopted might achieve the State's objective."' (citations omitted)). Commentators ap-
propriately saw an "invitation" in Nollan to begin moving towards a more general standard of height-
ened scrutiny for regulatory takings. See Jerold S. Kayden, Land-Use Regulations, Rationality, and
Judicial Review: The RSVP in the Nollan Invitation (Part 1), 23 UPB. LAW. 301, 313-16 (1991). Kay-
den's criticism of the role of means-ends analysis in regulatory takings challenges to land-use regulation
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Finally, having a due process inquiry explicitly embodied in takings ju-
risprudence spawned confusion in the lower courts.8" In a quarter-century
of confronting the Agins dicta, lower courts produced a variety of ap-
proaches to the relationship between the "substantially advances" test and
substantive due process.8 Some courts simply ignored the glaring tension
between a "substantially advances" test under the Takings Clause and
means-ends analysis under substantive due process, allowing both claims to
proceed essentially along similar lines. 2 Other courts, by contrast, held that
the availability of a takings claim precluded independent review under the
Due Process Clause where the challenge raised essentially the same theory,
on the principle that the former's more specific constitutional text should
not be circumvented by resort to the latter's open-ended terms.8 3
largely prefigured Lingle. See id. at 320-22; see also Barros, supra note 67, at 518-20 & n.243 (like-
wise anticipating Lingle).
80 During the pre-Lingle era, there were some procedural distinctions between substantive due proc-
ess challenges and challenges that had roughly the equivalent substantive content under Agins. See
Robert Ashbrook, Comment, Land Development, the Graham Doctrine, and the Extinction of Economic
Substantive Due Process, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1276-78 (2002).
81 These cases reflected a larger debate about the interaction between substantive due process and
other more specifically enumerated constitutional provisions. The debate has primarily focused on
whether the Due Process Clause should apply where some other provision, generally in the Bill of
Rights, appears to provide a more specific protection against the challenged governmental action. See
generally Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive Due Process, Procedural Due
Process, and the Bill of Rights, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 833 (2003).
82 See, e.g., Rozman v. City of Columbia Heights, 268 F.3d 588, 590-93 (8th Cir. 2001); Front
Royal & Warren County Indus. Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, 135 F.3d 275, 287-88 (4th Cir.
1998); Villager Pond, Inc. v. Town of Darien, 56 F.3d 375, 378-80 (2d Cir. 1995). See generally
Ashbrook, supra note 80.
83 Following the lead of the Ninth Circuit in Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1318 (9th Cir.
1996), several circuits applied the so-called "Graham Doctrine" to regulatory takings, holding that sub-
stantive due process claims are subsumed into accompanying takings claims and cannot be litigated
separately. See, e.g., S. County Sand & Gravel Co. v. Town of S. Kingstown, 160 F.3d 834, 835 (1st
Cir. 1998); Miller v. Campbell County, 945 F.2d 348, 352-53 (10th Cir. 1991). The Seventh Circuit
precluded substantive due process claims by referencing the long history of deference to legislatures in
economic due process claims. See Gosnell v. City of Troy, Ill., 59 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 1995); Conis-
ton Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 465 (7th Cir. 1988). The Fifth Circuit conducted
case-by-case analyses to determine whether both takings and substantive due process claims should pro-
ceed. See John Corp. v. City of Houston, 214 F.3d 573, 583 (5th Cir. 2000).
In application, the primary mischief that the Agins test wrought seems not to have involved the few
outlier cases in which the test was invoked in any substantive way (and prior to Lingle it had never been
tested directly before the Supreme Court), but rather the doctrinal confusion it sowed before the Court
and in the lower courts, and the lingering doubt it cast on the nature of the regulatory takings inquiry,
particularly whether the Takings Clause could serve to create a special category of governmental action
subject to less deferential review than would be afforded under the Due Process Clause or nondeferential
review. One open question after Lingle is the decision's effect in those circuits that did not allow a due
process claim that paralleled the "substantially advances" analysis. See R.S. Radford, Just a Flesh
Wound? The Impact of Lingle v. Chevron on Regulatory Takings Law, 38 URB. LAW. 437, 445-46
(2006). For an insightful analysis of the future of claims that Lingle has now clarified belong under due
process, see Byrne, supra note 10.
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The closest the Supreme Court came prior to Lingle to explicitly grap-
pling with the interaction between takings and substantive due process was
in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel.84 In Eastern Enterprises, which involved a
requirement that certain companies fund retiree health care benefits on a
retroactive basis,85 the Court splintered over the proper constitutional frame
for review. Four Justices-Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, and Thomas-found the Takings Clause appropriate to evaluate the
constitutionality of the retroactive funding obligation.86 The remaining five
Justices, although splitting on the result, agreed that the more appropriate
frame lay in the Due Process Clause.87 This confused melding of substan-
tive due process and regulatory takings is where things stood when the
Court agreed to hear Lingle.88
2. Justifying Means-Ends Analysis in the Law of Takings.-On a
theoretical level, treating regulatory takings as a question of means-ends
analysis has long been justified on the view that the Takings Clause should
stand as a check on arbitrary governmental action that diminishes the value
of property without sufficiently offsetting gain to society.89 This view pos-
its regulatory takings law as a species of substantive due process, unshack-
led from the deferential apparatus the Court has erected since the end of the
Lochner era for review of ordinary economic and social regulation under
the Due Process Clause. 90
84 524 U.S. 498 (1998). Eastern Enterprises was something of a hound that did not bark in Lingle,
at least until Justice Kennedy's concurrence. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 548
(2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also infra note 181.
85 See Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 516-19 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
86 See id. at 522-37.
87 Justice Kennedy, the swing vote in Eastern Enterprises, reasoned that while the Coal Act "im-
poses a staggering financial burden," the Takings Clause was not implicated because the Act "regulates
the former mine owner without regard to property. It does not operate upon or alter an identified prop-
erty interest, and it is not applicable to or measured by a property interest." Id. at 540 (Kennedy, J., con-
curring). Thus, although Justice Kennedy agreed that the Takings Clause was an inappropriate
constitutional framework of analysis, he joined the plurality in striking down the Coal Act as impermis-
sibly retroactive under the Due Process Clause. Id. at 549-50. The remaining four Justices likewise
concluded that the Takings Clause did not apply, id. at 554 (Breyer, J., dissenting), although they dis-
agreed with Justice Kennedy that the law failed under a Due Process retroactivity analysis. Id. at 566-
68.
88 The relationship between substantive due process and regulatory takings was tangentially raised
in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes of Monterey, 526 U.S. 687 (1999), where the Court had the op-
portunity to comment on jury instructions that had included the "substantially advances" test. See id. at
702-07. The Court, however, declined to rule on the role of means-ends scrutiny because the challenged
instructions had been drafted by the petitioner. See id. at 704. The Court likewise made passing refer-
ence to the "substantially advances" test in Tahoe-Sierra, but found that the issue was not presented.
See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 334 (2002).
89 See Michelman, supra note 13, at 1193-96 & n.62 (citing Robert Kratovil & Frank J. Harrison,
Eminent Domain-Policy and Concept, 42 CAL. L. REV. 596, 609 (1954)).
90 See, e.g., R.S. Radford, Of Course a Land Use Regulation that Fails to Substantially Advance
Legitimate State Interests Results in a Regulatory Taking, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 353, 382-95
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A more subtle approach to the role of the Takings Clause as a con-
straint on irrational governmental action can be found in the seminal work
of Joseph Sax.91 In his 1964 article, Takings and the Police Power, Sax ar-
gued for reframing the essential takings question towards its "real function
.. of provid[ing] a bulwark against arbitrary, unfair, or tyrannical govern-
ment."92 To do so, Sax emphasized a conception of property not as the sum
total of an owner's interests, but, rather, as a fluid end result of "a process
of competition among inconsistent and contending economic values."93
From this, Sax argued that a clear line could be drawn between economic-
loss arising from "government enhancement of its resource position in its
enterprise capacity" and "losses, however severe, incurred as a consequence
of government acting merely in its arbitral capacity"-government acting to
mediate disputes between competing private interests.94 Sax later modified
this framework,95 but it remained an influential way to think about the Tak-
ings Clause as a check on arbitrary or irrational governmental action.96
There is, finally, an efficiency aspect to the means-ends analysis in
regulatory takings. For some scholars, judicial review of regulation in sub-
stantive due process terms can be understood to incorporate an implicit
cost-benefit analysis, balancing the benefits to the public against the costs
to the individual.97 When the question under the Takings Clause is whether
the means that the government has chosen are "reasonable" in light of le-
gitimate ends, then a cost-benefit analysis that weighs individual harm and
social benefit can likewise inform the review of regulatory takings claims."
(2004) (discussing the independent value of a "substantially advances" inquiry under the Takings Clause
and arguing that the Court had articulated a midlevel standard of heightened judicial review under this
inquiry); Douglas W. Kmiec, Property and Economic Liberty as Civil Rights: The Magisterial History
of James W. Ely, Jr., 52 VAND. L. REV. 737, 744-51 (1999) (book review) (arguing that the Court has
applied heightened scrutiny for regulatory takings).
91 See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Compensation and the Interconnectedness of Property, 25
ECOLOGY L.Q. 327 (1999) (discussing Sax).
92 Sax, Police Power, supra note 13, at 64.
93 Id. at 61.
94 Id. at 63.
95 See Sax, Private Property, supra note 19, at 150-51, 155 (arguing for a vision of property as in-
terconnected, with the consequence that what Sax called "public rights" should be granted much greater
recognition in takings law). In many ways, Sax's call for recognition of public rights would import a
species of means-ends analysis, albeit one heavily steeped in what Sax appropriately saw as the under-
recognition in contemporary takings jurisprudence of the importance of certain restrictions on property
rights. Sax also limited his potentially open-ended call for a balancing of public and private interests by
focusing on certain types of externalities, or spillover effects. Id. at 161-62 (arguing that in the absence
of spillover effects, compensation should be paid whenever property rights are restricted).
96 Justice Brennan cited Sax for this proposition in Penn Central. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 128 (1978) (citing Sax, Police Power, supra note 13, in a discussion of
examples of takings that involve "government actions that may be characterized as acquisitions of re-
sources to permit or facilitate uniquely public functions").
97 See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 61, at 95-96.
98 See id. at 149-51.
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C. Takings as Equality
The third primary theme in regulatory takings law involves questions
of comparative burden and distributional justice. Although, as John Fee has
noted, regulatory takings doctrine "is commonly understood as a defense
for individuals against government actions that are extreme and unreason-
able as applied to the individual,"99 regulatory takings law can also be seen
as protecting a right to equal treatment by the state.' The equality dimen-
sion is ubiquitous as a theoretical justification for regulatory takings law,"1
but has long lain dormant in the jurisprudence.
1. Traces of Equality Norms: Armstrong, Generality, and Average
Reciprocity.-Doctrinally, the equality dimension is reflected in three re-
lated and overlapping concepts: the so-called Armstrong principle, general-
ity as an analytical variable, and the question of average reciprocity of
advantage.0 2 The Court in a variety of contexts has invoked these concepts,
although rarely with any clear explication of their precise content.
In Armstrong v. United States,1°3 the Court held that the Takings Clause
required compensation by the federal government for the destruction of cer-
tain materialmen's liens." In so doing, Justice Black famously stated that
99 Fee, supra note 13, at 1004.
100 See id. at 1007 (contrasting individual approaches to the Takings Clause with the Clause as "a
guarantee of equal treatment among members of a community").
101 See DANA & MERRILL, supra note 12, at 33-34; Ball & Reynolds, supra note 13, at 1533-47
(tracing burden distribution analysis through the corpus takings law); see also Saul Levmore, Just Com-
pensation and Just Politics, 22 CONN. L. REV. 285, 309 (1990) ("A central theme of takings law is that
protection is offered against the possibility that majorities may mistreat minorities.").
102 See Note, supra note 13, at 1040-44 ("The Court has used concepts such as average reciprocity
of advantage, generality, and [Armstrong's] fair burden sharing [principle] to determine whether certain
diminishments in property value should be considered takings."). Carlos Ball and Laurie Reynolds have
also drawn an explicit parallel between burden-distribution analysis in regulatory takings law and equal
protection. Ball and Reynolds, drawing on Lingle, distinguish between themes in takings jurisprudence
that focus on verticality-the burden's severity-and horizontality-the way in which the burden is dis-
tributed among property owners. See Ball & Reynolds, supra note 13, at 1533. They liken the vertical
burden inquiry to a substantive due process analysis and the horizontal burden inquiry to an equal pro-
tection analysis, in that the latter inquiry "compares the government's regulation of the plaintiff to its
regulation of similarly situated individuals." Id. at 1533 n.99. Ball and Reynolds draw on the horizontal
concern-the equality dimension-to argue that exactions review should focus on underinclusivity, bal-
anced by considerations of reciprocity of advantage in a reformulated rough-proportionality test. Id. at
1570-84.
103 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
104 See id. at 48. In Armstrong, the federal government had contracted with a shipbuilding company
for the construction of naval vessels. The contract provided that in the event of default, the government
could terminate and take title to and possession of all uncompleted work, with related materials. Sub-
contractors furnished materials to the company, and by operation of state law, the subcontractors were
granted liens in the materials and the work itself. When the contractor defaulted, the federal government
terminated the contract and took title to the contractor's materials and some partially completed hulls.
The subcontractors had not been paid for their materials, and filed suit alleging that the federal govern-
ment's sovereign immunity rendered the liens unenforceable and therefore constituted a taking. The
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the "Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not be taken
for a public use without just compensation was designed to bar Government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."' 5 This statement
has the feel of a passing rhetorical flourish, and substantively it is as much
of a cipher as Justice Holmes's "too far" test in Mahon."6
This articulation of the purpose of the Takings Clause, however, has
been embraced in a long line of modern regulatory takings cases,"07 receiv-
ing "a remarkable degree of assent across the spectrum of opinion."108 In-
deed, citing Armstrong, Justice Brennan prefaced his articulation of the
Penn Central factors with the proposition that at base the inquiry is an at-
tempt to determine "when 'justice and fairness' require that economic inju-
ries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than
remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons."'00
Court agreed and held that because the transfer of the materials to the government rendered the liens un-
enforceable (although still valid), this constituted a "taking" of the materialmen's property. Id. at 41,
46-49.
105 Id. at 49.
106 On the facts of Armstrong it was unclear why a consequential effect of the federal government's
sovereign immunity-which the Court found to have destroyed a cognizable property interest-said
anything about distribution of the burden on the particular holders of liens. Is a "public burden" not
borne disproportionately any time an individual cannot recover against the government because of sov-
ereign immunity? Were these particular subcontractors uniquely so burdened? Was this a phenomenon
that impacted materialmen-or some other group-through the country? The Court did not say. Nor
does the case tell us much about the underlying "unfairness" of the purported singling out in the case.
Indeed, Armstrong seems to have been more about a Lucas-style total deprivation of property; the Court
focused heavily on the fact that the liens were "destroyed" because they could not be enforced against
the federal government. See D. Benjamin Barros, Armstrong v. United States (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the author) (analyzing the Court's conference notes and drafts leading up to the Armstrong
decision and noting that three justices switched their positions out of apparent concern for the "total de-
struction" of the liens at issue). Notwithstanding, the rhetorical flourish at the end of the Court's discus-
sion has endured.
107 See Ball & Reynolds, supra note 13, at 1534 & n.104; Note, supra note 13, at 1044. Indeed, in
Lingle, the Court again cited the Armstrong principle to describe the central purpose of regulatory tak-
ings law. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005).
108 William Michael Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, the Narratives of Takings, and Compensa-
tion Statutes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1151, 1153 (1997).
109 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). See also Bowen v.
Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 608 (1987) (in applying Penn Central to reject a takings claim against certain
Aid to Familes with Dependent Children (AFDC) child-support attribution requirements, using the
"character of the governmental action" prong to incorporate the Armstrong principle). The Armstrong
principle parallels another oft-repeated admonition from the 1893 decision in Monongahela Navigation
Co. v. United States-a just compensation case-that the Takings Clause "prevents the public from
loading upon one individual more than his just share of the burdens of government," 148 U.S. 312, 325
(1893). See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 n.7 (1980); see also Lingle, 544
U.S. at 537 (citing Monongahela Navigation, 148 U.S. 312). John Fee has argued that Monongahela
Navigation can be seen as the foundation of the equality strand of regulatory takings law, and that when
the Court first invoked the Fourteenth Amendment to apply takings to the states, the Court cited equal
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A variation on the Armstrong principle is the concern with the general-
ity of a challenged governmental action. If Armstrong articulates a distribu-
tional fairness rationale, generality adds a political process undergirding.
As a conceptual focus, the question is whether a given regulation or gov-
ernmental action "is general in character, affecting not only the claimant but
others in the community as well, or whether instead the action singles out a
particular owner for unique treatment.""' In the modern doctrine, the
theme appeared in Justice Brennan's discussion in Penn Central of restric-
tions on property rights that generally "adjust[] the benefits and burdens of
economic life to promote the common good.""'
The importance of generality was central in the debate between Justice
Scalia and Justice Stevens in Lucas. Citing Armstrong and Monongahela
Navigation Co. v. United States,"2 Justice Stevens argued in dissent that the
generality of the Beachfront Management Act being challenged should have
been dispositive."3 It did not "target particular landowners, but rather regu-
late[d] the use of the coastline of the entire State."" 4 To Justice Scalia,
however, generality was no defense because the Act was "specifically di-
rected to land.""' 5 To Justice Scalia, the relevant category in assessing the
generality of the statute was the very category-specific landowners-
burdened by the Act, no matter how widespread that category might have
been."6 Justice Stevens, however, had the final (or most recent) word, in-
voking generality as a primary justification for rejecting per se liability for
temporary development moratoria in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council,
Inc.
117
protection, not due process. See Fee, supra note 13, at 1003 (citing Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co., 154 U.S. 362, 399, 410 (1894)).
110 Echeverria, supra note 11, at 24. Echeverria notes that the generality requirement has an eco-
nomic element of reciprocity of advantage as well: General regulations "should be less likely to raise
takings concerns... because they typically produce both burdens and countervailing benefits for indi-
vidual property owners." Id.
III Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. Justice Brennan also analyzed early harm-prevention police
power cases in terms of their widespread benefits and equal application. See id. at 133-34 n.30 ("[T]he
uses in issue in Hadacheck, Miller, and Goldblatt were perfectly lawful in themselves. They involved
no 'blameworthiness,... moral wrongdoing or conscious act of dangerous risk-taking which induce[d
society] to shift the cost to a pa[rt]icular individual.' These cases are better understood as resting not on
any supposed 'noxious' quality of the prohibited uses but rather on the ground that the restrictions were
reasonably related to the implementation of a policy-not unlike historic preservation-expected to pro-
duce a widespread public benefit and applicable to all similarly situated property." (quoting Sax, Police
Power, supra note 13, at 50)).
112 148 U.S. 312.
113 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1074 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114 Id. Moreover, Justice Stevens argued, the Act imposed similar burdens on owners of developed
and undeveloped parcels. Id. at 1074-75.
115 Id. at 1027 n.14 (majority opinion).
116 Id. at 1027.
H7 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 341 (2002); see
Echeverria, supra note 11, at 35-36. John Echeverria has argued persuasively that the Court's increas-
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Equality norms, finally, are reflected in a concept that predated Mahon
but that has become associated primarily with the case: "average reciprocity
of advantage.""' 8 In Mahon, Justice Holmes appears to have been suspi-
cious of the regulatory requirement to leave a column of coal in place to
prevent subsidence in part because he thought that the companies so bur-
dened received nothing in return."9 In other instances that Justice Holmes
distinguished, similar requirements ultimately benefited the burdened par-
ties, at least in part. 2° In this sense, the regulated coal companies had been
singled out.'2'
As with most other themes from Mahon, reciprocity resurfaced in the
modem doctrine in Penn Central.'22 Then-Justice Rehnquist argued in dis-
sent that, unlike zoning, the historic preservation restriction challenged in
Penn Central conferred no common benefit on restricted owners.'23 Justice
Brennan countered that legislation "designed to promote the general welfare
commonly burdens some more than others."'24 Justice Brennan continued
that, in any event, given the number of landmarked buildings and districts
ing focus on generality, most evident in Tahoe-Sierra, reflects the ascendancy of Justice Stevens's view
of regulatory takings. See id. at 40.
118 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); see Raymond R. Coletta, Reciprocity of Ad-
vantage and Regulatory Takings: Toward a New Theory of Takings Jurisprudence, 40 AM. U. L. REV.
297, 305-19 (1990); Lynda J. Oswald, The Role of the "Harm/Benefit" and "Average Reciprocity of
Advantage" Rules in a Comprehensive Takings Analysis, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1449, 1490-1501 (1997)
(discussing the historical development of the concept of "average reciprocity of advantage"); see also
Andrew W. Schwartz, Reciprocity of Advantage: The Antidote to the Antidemocratic Trend in Regula-
tory Takings, 22 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 46-47 (2004). Justice Holmes first coined the phrase,
in dicta, in a case decided shortly before Mahon, Jackman v. Rosenbaum, 260 U.S. 22 (1922), which re-
jected a challenge to a party wall statute under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, id. at
30. See Oswald, supra, at 1491.
119 See Oswald, supra note 118, at 1504-05.
120 Id. at 1511-12. The Kohler Act, the statute challenged in Mahon, had the effect of abrogating
waivers of subsidence claims. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412-13. Holmes saw no "average reciprocity of ad-
vantage" inuring to the restricted coal companies because the statute protected only specific dwelling
owners (and owners who may have understood the risks of subsidence when they purchased) without
conferring any wider benefit to the public. Other statutes promoting public safety that had been upheld,
such as a statute that required coal mining companies to leave pillars of coal in place in order to protect
miners' safety, more readily could be seen as reciprocally benefiting the companies themselves. Id. at
413-14.
121 Average reciprocity of advantage embodies two distinct concepts: the singling-out equality as-
pect and the notion of implicit compensation. Carol Rose has noted that the concept's latter guise serves
as an anti-redistributional limit on regulation, in that vulnerability under the Takings Clause can turn on
the extent to which, in the aggregate, owners are compensated for the deprivations they incur. See Rose,
supra note 39, at 581-82.
122 See Oswald, supra note 118, at 1511-12.
123 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 140 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(arguing that "[a]ll property owners in a designated area are placed under the same restrictions, not only
for the benefit of the municipality as a whole but also for the common benefit of one another," and quot-
ing Justice Holmes, who, "speaking for the Court in [Mahon], [said] there is 'an average reciprocity of
advantage').
124 Id. at 133 (majority opinion).
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in New York, some close to and likely benefiting Grand Central Station, the
station's owner received some offsetting compensation as part of the gen-
eral scheme.'25 Average reciprocity of advantage has continued as a theme
in a number of other modem cases. 26
2. Theories of Equality in Takings.-Equality approaches to regula-
tory takings have been rationalized on a number of theoretical grounds.
Frank Michelman's classic analysis, for example, is centrally concerned
with deciding "when government may exercise public programs while leav-
ing associated costs disproportionately concentrated upon one or a few per-
sons."'127 Michelman argued that the government should compensate
property holders when "demoralization" costs-the psychological costs as-
sociated with the realization that compensation is absent and the costs of
foregone production-outweigh "settlement" costs-the costs of compensa-
tion necessary to avoid demoralization and the costs of the compensation
system itself.'2t
At the heart of Michelman's account are hypothetical perceptions of
the distributional fairness of regulatory burdens. To Michelman, demorali-
zation arises from a sense by property holders that harm to their interests by
governmental action represents "capricious redistribution."'2 9  In other
125 Id. at 134-35. Lynda Oswald reads Justice Brennan's discussion of the advantages that the
owner of Grand Central Station received, as part of the scheme of historic preservation in New York
City, as a form of cost-benefit analysis automatically validating "any alleged police power action which
confers a substantial benefit upon society at large." Oswald, supra note 118, at 1522 (emphasis omit-
ted). Justice Brennan's discussion of the comprehensive nature of the preservation regime, however, see
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 134-35, calls to mind a more particularized analysis.
126 See Oswald, supra note 118, at 1512-20 (discussing cases); Schwartz, supra note 118, at 51-61
(same). In some sense, Justice Kennedy's decision in Palazzolo evinces a weak form of an equality-
based inquiry in its interpretation of the Lucas exception to per se liability for restrictions on property
rights that inhere in title. In rejecting the proposition that mere transfer of title is sufficient to transform
any public-law limitation on property rights into a "background principle of state law" under Lucas, the
Court speculated in dicta that evaluation of such principles turns on "common, shared understandings."
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630 (2001). One way to read this is to import a collective de-
cision (however divined) to limit property at some point to create a formal barrier to any reasonable in-
dividual expectation of that particular use of property. Cf Joseph L. Sax, Why America Has a Property
Rights Movement, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 513, 515 ("The notion of background principles acknowledges
the right of the community to set standards at the outset."). In other words, an individual's expectations
in the absence of some comparative context do not provide a discemable line between a permissible ex-
ercise of the police power and unconstitutional governmental action under the Takings Clause, even in
the Lucas total-deprivation context.
127 Michelman, supra note 13, at 1165.
128 Id. at 1214-15. Michelman applied this formula after crossing the threshold of efficiency in the
Kaldor-Hicks sense that the benefits the prospective gainers would be willing to pay exceed the losses
that the prospective losers would be willing to accept. See id. at 1214; see also id. at 1174 & n.18.
129 Id. at 1215. Michelman argued that demoralization represented by a realization of exploitation
by majority rule is likely to occur where a claimant suffers disproportionate injuries, where a loss is not
likely to be offset by reciprocal benefits in the project or in future projects, or where the claimant lacks
political influence to gain mitigation. See Dagan, supra note 13, at 764-66 (analyzing Michelman).
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words, a person should regard a decision to regulate as fair if that person
and others similarly situated would be better off in the long run.13 As
Michelman put it, given the impracticality of strict proportionality in the
costs and benefits of collective action, a compensation regime should at
least strive for "an acceptable level of assurance that over time the burdens
associated with collectively determined improvements will have been dis-
tributed 'evenly' enough so that everyone will be a net gainer."' 131
Other commentators have looked to equality norms for the similar po-
tential of such norms to instantiate notions of fairness in the law of tak-
ings.132 John Fee, for example, has argued for viewing regulatory takings
law as an antidiscrimination or comparative principle that distinguishes be-
tween formal equality and substantive equality, with the Fifth Amendment
requiring only the former. 133  John Costonis earlier argued for a similar
130 See Michelman, supra note 13, at 1223 ("A decision not to compensate is not unfair as long as
the disappointed claimant ought to be able to appreciate how such decisions might fit into a consistent
practice which holds forth a lesser long-run risk to people like him than would any consistent practice
which is naturally suggested by the opposite decision.").
131 Id. at 1225 (emphasis omitted). Robert Ellickson built on Michelman's framework to argue that
the compensation question should be evaluated under a "normal behavior" standard. See Robert C. El-
lickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 419-24
(1977) ("[W]hen a government program merely requires that all laggards come up to the standards of
normal behavior, citizens do share a reciprocity of burdens, and the program does not violate-in fact it
promotes-horizontal equity." (citing Michelman, supra note 13, at 1235-37)); see also Robert C. El-
lickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U.
CHI. L. REv. 681, 728-33 (1973); William A. Fischel, Introduction: Utilitarian Balancing and Formal-
ism in Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1581, 1584 (1988). "Normal behavior," of course, is a comparative
standard.
132 As noted, Joseph Sax in his early work on takings included the problem of governmental dis-
crimination-singling out-in the irrationality that he initially felt the Takings Clause should police
against. See Sax, Police Power, supra note 13, at 64-65; see also Sax, Private Property, supra note 19,
at 169-70 (reiterating the necessity for a constraint against governmental decisions to select among
owners upon whom a burden might fall, which Sax described as "the equal protection dimension of
compensation law").
133 See Fee, supra note 13, at 1049-60; id. at 1050 ("[A] regulation.., is not a taking if it applies to
a broad community of owners and is reasonably designed for the overall benefit of that community.").
Fee compares his proposal for takings doctrine as formal equality to the Equal Protection Clause, but has
in mind an independent structure of analysis. He argues, for example, that "[u]nder a formal equality
standard, a land use restriction is a taking if it applies to only one owner," because "that owner is forced
to sacrifice something unique for the public benefit." Id. at 1054. This does not seem to track the analy-
sis (although might, in some instances, mirror the outcome) that a deferential rational-basis equal protec-
tion inquiry would require. The latter asks whether there is any conceivable rational basis for relevant
distinctions. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) ("[A] classification 'must be upheld
against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide
a rational basis for the classification."' (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313
(1993))); Cent. State Univ. v. Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors, 526 U.S. 124, 127-28 (1999) (per curiam).
See also Note, supra note 13, at 1044-47 (discussing competing conceptions of equality that might in-
form takings jurisprudence).
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noneconomic balancing of redistributive goals in a conscious importation of
a fairness inquiry.'34
Some commentators have gone further, looking to equality norms as a
guarantee of substantive fairness, attempting to give content to the intui-
tions reflected in Armstrong's rhetoric. Hanoch Dagan, for example, has
argued for engrafting progressive distributive concerns onto the law of tak-
ings in order to recognize the importance of equality.135 Dagan's approach
is to reconceptualize reciprocity of advantage in terms of social responsibil-
ity-highlighting the fact that a claimant "is a member of a community"
and, as such, should bear certain responsibilities (and enjoy various bene-
fits).'36 Dagan similarly looks to diminution in value to instantiate egalitar-
ian concerns, as a way to recognize the claims of those who are worse-off in
the community.'37
From a significantly different set of normative assumptions, there is a
natural law justification for the equality dimension of regulatory takings.
As David Dana and Thomas Merrill have noted, natural law theorists argue
that compensation is required "'to even the score when a given person has
been required to give up property rights beyond his just share of the cost of
government. '"'138 This resonates strongly with the fairness rationales under-
lying the Armstrong principle.'39 Similarly, Hanoch Dagan has observed
that there is an aspect of distributional justice in the libertarian perspec-
tive. 4 ' Dagan sees a commitment to proportionality in Richard Epstein's
argument that any redistribution requires compensation. Although Dagan
rejects the absolutist consequences of Epstein's approach, Dagan draws
from Epstein a reminder of the importance of not forcing "disproportionate"
burdens on individuals. 4'
Another important theoretical justification for equality-based ap-
proaches to regulatory takings can be found among public choice theorists.
From this perspective, certain groups or classes of property holders are un-
able to compete fairly in the political process and thus merit protection from
the courts from majoritarian excess.
134 See John J. Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model for the Taking Issue,
58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 465, 488 (1983).
135 See Dagan, supra note 13, at 742 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
136 See id. at 771.
137 See id. at 778-81. Dagan focuses on diminution in value, refashioning the test to take into con-
sideration total property holdings in a community, thus incentivizing public actors to burden those rela-
tively more able to bear such burdens. See id. at 782-84.
138 DANA & MERRILL, supra note 12, at 33 (quoting William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of
Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 587 (1972)); see also Stoebuck, supra, at 583-88 (discussing
natural-law just-share theories of the compensation requirement).
139 See DANA & MERRILL, supra note 12, at 34.
140 See Dagan, supra note 13, at 757-58.
141 ld. at 761-62.
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Saul Levmore, for example, has argued that takings law requires com-
pensation to "individuals or groups that do not regularly participate in po-
litical bargains," because it is with these categories of persons that
arguments about the need for the internalization of the costs of governmen-
tal decisionmaking apply most clearly. 42 Glynn Lunney has argued more
generally that the Takings Clause should be interpreted to require compen-
sation when legislative conflicts over property pit a dispersed group against
a concentrated group. 43 Daniel Farber has raised an insightful critique of
some scholars' overly deterministic views of which groups can best protect
themselves through the political process.1" Farber has argued instead that
an equality approach to takings-what Farber describes as a focus on "hori-
zontal equity"' 45 -would suggest that compensation be mandatory when-
ever governmental action occurs that under ordinary democratic processes
would yield compensation but for the "unusual political vulnerability" of
the group involved. 46
William Fischel's view of takings as a check on majoritarian excess
adds a distinctive federalist (actually, localist) overlay.'47 Fischel generally
acknowledges the countermajoritarian difficulty with invoking the Takings
Clause to review regulation. Fischel nonetheless has argued that property
owners with immobile assets face a failure of both voice and exit as a
means of disciplining the political process.' Thus, heightened judicial
scrutiny is appropriate for local governmental regulation of owners who
lack the ability to move.'49
142 See Levmore, supra note 101, at 305-14.
143 See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A Critical Reexamination of the Takings Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L.
REv. 1892, 1954-55 (1992).
144 See Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279, 287-94
(1992).
145 Id. at 308.
146 Id. at 306; see also id. at 294-99, 303 (describing a theory of takings as "universalizing" the oth-
erwise general practice of compensation).
147 See FISCHEL, supra note 19, at 115-16, 135-40. Fischel is more generally concerned with a ma-
joritarian model of governmental decisionmaking under which political authorities seek to maximize
voters' desires. Id. at 206. Fischel models a limited compensation rule that balances fiscal illusion
(governmental cost internalization) against the countervailing risk of private overinvestment from a full
compensation regime. Id. at 205.
148 See id. at 135-36.
149 See id. at 139, 328. Fischel applies his political process rationale for judicial supervision to cer-
tain state and federal agencies as well. Id. at 139, 329-31. Thus, for Fischel, the safeguards of the po-
litical process can be trusted at the federal level and (generally) at the state level, but much less often at
the local level (Fischel is also suspicious of judges themselves, id. at 331-32). Christopher Serkin re-
cently argued for a similar review of local governmental action, less on Fischel's political process
grounds and more on grounds of the unique distortions that local governments face in their regulatory
incentives. See Christopher Serkin, Big Differences for Small Governments: Local Governments and the
Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1624 (2006).
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William Treanor, finally, has provided what he describes as a process
synthesis of takings law that is more faithful to original intent.50 Treanor
would hold that "[c]ompensation is due when a governmental action affects
only the property interests of an individual or a small group of people and
when, in the absence of compensation, there would be a lack of horizontal
equity (i.e., when compensation is the norm in similar circumstances)."''
These arguments highlight different potential structural failures in the
political process, but all posit that differential treatment of somehow identi-
fiable subsets of property rights holders merits judicial intervention under
the Takings Clause.'52 In other words, these approaches treat the burden of
a regulation on a subset of property owners as the same kind of political
process failure that gives rise to heightened scrutiny for classic "discrete
and insular minorities.'
'1 53
This overview of the three primary themes in the regulatory takings ju-
risprudence provides a framework through which to understand the rise of
equality norms. It is to recent developments that are ushering in a new
landscape in the law of regulatory takings that we now turn.
II. THE EMERGING JURISPRUDENCE
This Part analyzes two trends that together are bringing the equality
dimension of regulatory takings to the fore. First, the Court is muting the
doctrinal and practical significance of the functional equivalence theme in
its various guises. At the same time, the Court in Lingle explicitly untan-
gled regulatory takings from its long embrace with substantive due process.
Together, these trends leave much more room for equality norms in the ju-
risprudence.
A. The Muting of Functional Equivalence
In eroding the foundations underlying the theme of regulatory takings
as functionally equivalent to the direct exercise of eminent domain, the
15o See Treanor, supra note 18, at 872.
151 Id. Treanor also suggests that compensation should be mandatory in cases involving the kinds
of discrete and insular minorities traditionally thought protected by heightened scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause, for example, in environmental justice claims. See id. at 875.
152 See id. at 866-72 (outlining various public-choice oriented process-based approaches).
153 Cf Karkkainen, supra note 50, at 912 ("If the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause does apply to
the states, then it must be interpreted to stand as a safeguard against just the kinds of abuses of govern-
mental power that led to its being appended to the Constitution in the first place-defects in the political
process that lead to the arbitrary 'singling out' of individuals or 'discrete and insular' classes of property
owners for harsher treatment than the rest, whether to benefit other identifiable individuals or classes, or
to benefit of the public generally.").
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Court is increasingly relegating the theme to marginal importance. To be-
gin, the Court in several recent cases-notably Tahoe-Sierra'54 and Brown
v. Legal Foundation of Washington 55-has begun to distance regulatory
takings from parallelism with physical takings, an important conceptual un-
derpinning to functional equivalence. This primarily has been a rhetorical
turn, but it has provided justification for backing away from intimations of
heightened scrutiny and per se liability. 56
The second, and more consequential, development has been the
Court's embrace of the parcel-as-a-whole rule. Margaret Radin aptly la-
beled the division of property rights and physical boundaries for evaluation
under the Takings Clause as "conceptual severance."' 57 Conceptual sever-
ance has arisen primarily in the physical sense of dividing a parcel into dis-
tinct slices based on a given regulatory scheme and then evaluating the
impact of a regulation on an individual slice. For example, one question in
Penn Central was whether the impact of the landmark preservation statute
at issue should be evaluated in terms of the value of lost air rights (the "par-
cel" of property above the existing structure that was under contention).'58
Conceptual severance has also arisen, much more controversially, in the
sense of specific rights in the hypothetical bundle, for example where a
regulation has interfered with the right to exclude.'59
In Tahoe-Sierra, the Court evaluated a temporary development morato-
rium as the temporal equivalent of physical severance-a slice of property
154 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321-25 (2002)
(discussing a "fundamental distinction" between physical and regulatory takings).
155 538 U.S. 216, 231-34 (2003) (discussing the same distinction).
156 See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 348-49 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing against the
Court's rejection of equivalency from the perspective of the expectations of an owner). The Court has
repeatedly retreated when confronted with the more extreme consequences of its signal functional
equivalency cases. After Loretto, for example, the Court faced the logical argument that a rent control
provision that gave tenants certain rights of occupancy was a per se taking as a permanent physical oc-
cupation. See Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992). The Court was not willing to apply Loretto to
this occupation, see id. at 527-28, quickly closing a door that Loretto might have opened.
157 See Radin, Liberal Conception, supra note 54, at 1676.
158 In Penn Central, Justice Brennan stated that:
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to de-
termine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a
particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the charac-
ter of the action and on the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a
whole-here, the city tax block designated as the "landmark site."
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978). After Penn Central, the Court
was at times less than firm in its statements about the vitality and content of this approach. See, e.g.,
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631-32 (2001); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1016-17 n.7 (1992).
159 See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178-80 (1979). See generally Thomas
W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REv. 730 (1998) (discussing the right to ex-
clude as foundational in property).
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over the dimension of time, rather than space. 6 ° In Tahoe-Sierra, the Court
endorsed the "parcel as a whole" rule. 6' The Court indicated that the "rele-
vant parcel" required consideration of property as an "aggregate ... in its
entirety."'62
This aggregation rule makes it more difficult to assert that a regulatory
burden on property constitutes the functional equivalent of the direct exer-
cise of eminent domain. This is so because, as a practical matter, most
regulatory takings have only a limited impact on property rights when an
interest holder's physical property, temporal property, or specific property
rights are evaluated in their entirety. Functionally, then, the theme of
equivalence to direct expropriation has become a mechanism to channel
certain unusual claims-claims involving particularly sharp invasions of
physical property and particularly extreme diminutions in value-out of the
Penn Central analysis.'63
After Loretto, claims based on physical interference either give rise to
per se liability in instances of permanent physical invasion, or require some
other basis for evaluating whether a taking has occurred. Physical equiva-
lence was the basis for Penn Central's "character" prong, but Loretto
carved out this aspect of the Penn Central analysis, making clear that per-
manent physical invasions represent a unique form of harm in regulatory
takings law. 64 Courts applying Penn Central could still inquire as to how
close to a physical invasion a challenged regulation comes. Decoupling the
Penn Central character prong from its origins in cases of permanent occu-
pation, however, leaves no guidance on how to evaluate instances of physi-
cal interference not rising to a Loretto invasion.'65 Thus, claims based on
physical invasion in a few rare instances will be decided under Loretto; all
other such claims must be decided under a Penn Central test for which gra-
dations of physical interference standing alone reveal nothing.
Likewise, after Lucas, assertions based on diminution in value face a
similar bifurcated treatment. Claims that involve total deprivation merit per
se liability, although such instances will be exceedingly rare.'66 All other
160 See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331-32.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 327 (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979)).
163 John Costonis has argued that the kinds of factors that once determined categories of takings
claims-property as a "thing" versus property as a relation, for example-evolved into factors that in-
fluence the ad hoc inquiry. See Costonis, supra note 134, at 467. Lingle and other recent decisions such
as Tahoe-Sierra have reinforced this, increasingly culling out and isolating the per se categories as spe-
cial cases. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322; see also Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 636 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (arguing against "what amount to per se rules" in regulatory takings).
164 See Steven J. Eagle, "Character" as "Worthiness ": A New Meaning for Penn Central's Third
Test?, 27 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 1, 2 (2004).
165 Cf Whitman, supra note 20, at 578.
166 See Echeverria, supra note 11, at 40 (commenting that Lucas has been narrowed "to practical ir-
relevance").
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claims require some other basis for discerning when a regulatory burden has
gone too far. In other words, anything short of a total deprivation must be
decided under Penn Central, but diminution in value will reveal nothing as
a freestanding element of that analysis. As was suggested in the back-and-
forth between Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens in Lucas'67 and acknowl-
edged in other cases,'68 for injuries to property rights that fall short of a
wipeout, some other analytical tool is required.
In short, the overwhelming majority of regulatory takings claims will
be resolved under Penn Central, but under Penn Central, the explanatory
force of the theme of functional equivalence has been significantly dimin-
ished.169
B. The End of Means-Ends Analysis
As noted, a number of landmark regulatory takings cases have directly
or indirectly drawn on substantive due process precedents, or at least on the
means-ends inquiry implicit in references to the "substantially advances"
test. 7° In Lingle, the Court finally and forthrightly untangled this long em-
brace between regulatory takings and substantive due process.
In Lingle, Chevron had challenged a Hawaii statute that limited the
rent the company could charge its lessee-dealer gas stations.' Chevron
prevailed in 'the lower courts on the theory that the statute "fail[ed] to sub-
stantially advance a legitimate state interest" under Agins.'72 The District
167 In Lucas, Justice Stevens in dissent criticized the total wipeout rule as "wholly arbitrary," given
that a "landowner whose property is diminished 95% recovers nothing," while an owner with only a
slightly greater deprivation "recovers the land's full value." Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1064-65 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia acknowledged that "[i]t is true that in at
least some cases the landowner with 95% loss will get nothing, while the landowner with total loss will
recover in full," id. at 1019-20 n.8 (majority opinion), although he maintained that "takings law is full
of these 'all-or-nothing' situations." Id.
168 See Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993)
("[M]ere diminution in value, however serious, is insufficient to demonstrate a taking."); John D.
Echeverria, A Turning of the Tide: The Tahoe-Sierra Regulatory Takings Decision, 32 ENVTL. L. REP.
11,235, 11,246 (2002); see also DANA & MERRILL, supra note 12, at 135 (observing that "[s]hort of 100
percent loss in value ... the degree of diminution is just one factor to be considered [in deciding
whether a taking has occurred]").
169 In other words, after Lucas and Loretto, anything short of a total diminution in value or perma-
nent physical occupation will be decided under a version of Penn Central in which diminution and
physical invasion are empty considerations in the absence of either means-ends analysis or an evaluation
of comparative harm. As discussed below, however, any interpretation of Penn Central that involves a
balancing of public benefit and private harm cannot be reconciled with Lingle's repudiation of the Agins
means-ends test. See infra Part lI.B.
170 See supra Part I.B.
171 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 532-33 (2005).
172 Id. at 534 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Cayetano, 57 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1014 (D. Haw.
1998)).
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Court, following Ninth Circuit precedent,' evaluated the legislation under
a standard of review that did not accord the legislation any deference.'74
This led to a battle of the experts on the likely efficacy of the legislation,
with the District Court siding with Chevron's expert.'75 After the Ninth
Circuit affirmed this decision, the Supreme Court reversed.
Justice O'Connor's opinion for a unanimous Court directly attacked
the Agins test as anomalous. In doing so, the Court explored the primary
tests through which the Court had judged regulations under the Takings
Clause: the Loretto permanent physical occupation, the Lucas deprivation
of all economically beneficial uses, and, "[o]utside these two relatively nar-
row categories (and the special context of land-use exactions),"'76 the Penn
Central analysis.'77 Each of these inquiries, the Court stated, "aims to iden-
tify regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking
in which government directly appropriates private property or ousts the
owner from his domain."' 78 "Accordingly," the Court concluded, "each of
these tests focuses directly upon the severity of the burden that government
imposes upon private property rights."'79
With this initial framework, the Court turned to what had gone awry in
Agins. Noting Agins's reliance on Euclid and Nectow, the Court stated that
"[t]here is no question that the 'substantially advances' test was derived
from due process, not takings, precedents."'' 0 Thus, the test required a spe-
cies of due process analysis: "a regulation that fails to serve any legitimate
governmental objective may be so arbitrary or irrational that it runs afoul of
the Due Process Clause."' 81
173 See Chevron, 57 F. Supp. 2d, at 1009 (discussing Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu,
124 F.3d 1150, 1158 (9th Cir. 1997)).
174 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 535-36.
175 Id. The District Court found Chevron's expert "more persuasive" on the likely economic effects
of the legislation and accordingly found a violation of the Takings Clause under the Agins "substantially
advances" test. Id. at 535.
176 Id. at 538.
177 As to Nollan and Dolan, the Court cast them as "special application[s]" of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine rather than as any kind of general application of heightened scrutiny. Id. at 545-48.
178 Id. at 539. In this, the Court shifted from equality to functional equivalence without explaining
the connection between these two views of the Takings Clause.
179 Id.
80 Id. at 540.
181 Id. at 542. On this point, perhaps unable to resist an "I told you so," Justice Kennedy concurred
to make clear that the Court's excision of substantive due process means-ends analysis from takings
"does not foreclose the possibility that a regulation might be so arbitrary or irrational as to violate due
process." Id. at 548-49 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 539 (1998)
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
Lingle will likely impact the issues left unresolved by the Court in Eastern Enterprises. See supra
text accompanying notes 84-88. Recall that in Eastern Enterprises, the Court splintered not over the
role of means-ends analysis as such, but over the more general question whether a forced transfer of
funds that imposed retroactive liability is properly analyzed as an interference with property cognizable
under the Takings Clause or is better reviewed under the general "fairness" (in the sense of rationality)
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The Court noted that Agins's reliance on due process reflected in part a
similar comingling in Penn Central,12 and also the practice by the Court of
"referring to deprivations of property without due process of law as 'tak-
ings."" 83  Despite this history, the Court noted, means-ends analysis "re-
veals nothing about the magnitude or character of the burden a particular
regulation imposes upon private property rights. Nor does it provide any
information about how any regulatory burden is distributed among property
owners."'84 The Court then concluded that the "'substantially advances'
formula is not a valid takings test, and indeed... has no proper place in our
takings jurisprudence.' 8 5
The Court emphasized that the "substantially advances" test could be
read "to demand heightened means-ends review of virtually any regulation
of private property."' 6 The Court focused on the absurdity of such scrutiny
in Lingle itself, with a relatively mundane example of economic legislation
dictates of the Due Process Clause. That conflict reflected tensions between conceptions of regulatory
takings that essentially protect only nonfungible types of property versus property as value, central to
Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Eastern Enterprises. See Ronald. J. Krotoszynski, Expropriatory In-
tent: Defining the Proper Boundaries of Substantive Due Process and the Takings Clause, 80 N.C. L.
REv. 713, 744-49 (2002) (describing Justice Kennedy's due process analysis in Eastern Enterprises as
"appropriate[]" but noting that his proposed test for regulatory takings "fails to capture the essence of a
regulatory taking-expropriatory intent"). After Lingle, the Eastern Enterprises plurality's embrace of
open-ended fairness review (awkwardly applying Penn Central to the question of legislative retroactiv-
ity) seems conceptually untenable.
182 See supra text accompanying notes 68-71.
183 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 541. Indeed, Lingle noted, when the Court decided Agins, it "had yet to clar-
ify whether 'regulatory takings' claims were properly cognizable under the Takings Clause or the Due
Process Clause." Id. at 541-542 (citing Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank,
473 U.S. 172, 197-99 (1985)).
184 Id. at 542. In response to Chevron's attempt to reframe the Agins test as an Armstrong "fairness
and justice" question, the Court reiterated that a regulation's effectiveness reveals nothing about "the
actual burden imposed on property rights, or how that burden is allocated." Id. at 542-43.
185 Id. at 548. Given how frequently the Court had invoked Agins, if only rhetorically, the Lingle
Court felt compelled to argue that its holding "does not require us to disturb any of our prior holdings."
Id. at 543-45. The Court dismissed most of its prior citations to the "substantially advances" test by not-
ing that the test had never served as the basis of a finding that a compensable taking had occurred, with
the possible exception of Nollan and Dolan. Id. at 546. The Court limited the exaction doctrine, how-
ever, to "Fifth Amendment takings challenges to adjudicative land-use exactions" involving physical
access to property, and recast them as a "special application" of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
Id. at 547.
Where Lingle leaves review of exactions more generally raises important questions, but is beyond
the scope of this Article. Lingle arguably removes Nollan and Dolan from the canon of regulatory tak-
ings law altogether. Without a grounding in the "substantially advances" concept (and heightened scru-
tiny), recasting Nollan and Dolan as "special applications" of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine,
as Lingle did, begs a rather obvious question. Any constitutional right that served as the quid for the pro
quo of discretionary approval in an adjudicatory land-use case would seem to fit Lingle's description of
Nollan and Dolan. Where the "takings" aspect of that quid pro quo now fits is unclear, but for an excel-
lent discussion of Lingle's possible impact, see Fenster, Exactions, supra note 21, at 750-58.
186 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 544.
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becoming the subject of a bench trial and a battle of the experts. 87 Accord-
ingly, the Court broadly endorsed deferential review.188
One interpretation of Lingle's excision of means-ends analysis is that
the Court's correction of this seeming doctrinal anomaly says nothing about
the range of interests cognizable under Penn Central. R.S. Radford has ar-
gued, for example, that the "same economic analysis and empirical research
that previously informed 'failure to substantially advance' takings claims
can be relatively smoothly transitioned into the Penn Central frame-
work." '189 Applications of the Penn Central test prior to Lingle certainly at
times devolved into a species of means-ends testing, balancing the strength
of the government's interest against the harm to the property owner. 9 '
More broadly, Steven Eagle recently argued that Penn Central as a whole is
a due process, not a takings, test.'
These arguments ignore the significant effort the Court undertook in
Lingle to clarify the nature of the doctrine and scope of the inquiry under
Penn Central, no less than under Agins.192 When the Court stated that "the
187 Id. at 535.
188 Id. at 545 ("The reasons for deference to legislative judgments about the need for, and likely ef-
fectiveness of, regulatory actions are by now well established, and we think they are no less applicable
here."). In this respect, Lingle undermines the rationale of earlier attempts to impose bright-line (and
generally nondeferential) review under a view of the Takings Clause predicated on "property rights" as a
category of fundamental rights. Lingle, for example, undercuts the invocation of means-ends analysis in
Lucas as a means of distinguishing long-standing precedent involving significant reduction in property
value. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1023-24 (1992) ("'Harmful or noxious use'
analysis was, in other words, simply the progenitor of our more contemporary statements that 'land-use
regulation does not effect a taking if it "substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests"....'" (quot-
ing Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255, 260 (1980)))). It is not clear how to approach Lucas once the Agins means-ends framework is
removed as the basis for distinguishing police-power cases like Mugler and Hadacheck. One distinct
possibility is that the Lucas exception for restrictions that inhere in the title can be given a more expan-
sive reading, reincorporating the broader propositions for which Mugler and its kin once stood. See Lu-
cas, 505 U.S. at 1050-51 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Regardless, Lingle calls into question the aspect of
the Lucas analysis that relies on Agins.
189 Radford, supra note 83, at 449-50.
190 After Loretto, for example, some courts and commentators focused on "character" as a way to
incorporate means-ends analysis in the Penn Central test. See Echeverria, supra note 168, at 11,246-47;
Whitman, supra note 20, at 578-81; see also Steven J. Eagle, "Character of the Governmental Action "
In Takings Law: Past, Present, and Future (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Apr. 22-24, 2004), WL SJ052
ALI-ABA 459, 463-65. See, e.g., Maritrans, Inc. v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 277, 282 (2001); Pharm.
Care Mgmt. Ass'n v. Rowe, 307 F. Supp. 2d 164, 180 (D. Me. 2004); Kelly v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning
Agency, 855 P.2d 1027, 1035 (Nev. 1993); cf Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470, 485-93 (1987) (citing Agins to discuss the importance of the regulation at issue).
191 See Steven J. Eagle, Property Tests, Due Process Tests, and Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence,
BYU L. REV. 899 (2007). Eagle also asserts that the Court's purported disentangling in Lingle is inco-
herent, given what he views as a doctrine "steeped in due process." Id. at 901.
192 See Whitman, supra note 20, at 582 (arguing that Lingle forecloses balancing governmental in-
terests in applying Penn Central); cf Byrne, supra note 10, at I ("Lingle cut off any doctrinal path for
heightened judicial scrutiny of the validity of land use regulations in defense of property rights.").
Moreover, this argument ignores the extent to which the Court identified the Agins test with the infusion
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Penn Central inquiry turns in large part, albeit not exclusively, upon the
magnitude of a regulation's economic impact and the degree to which it in-
terferes with legitimate property interests," '93 it was hardly as a prelude to
incorporating into Penn Central the very inquiry into a "regulation's under-
lying validity"'94 that the Court was repudiating.195 Lingle thus clearly sepa-
rated regulatory takings jurisprudence from its long embrace with
substantive due process.'96
C. The Emergence of Equality Norms
In excising means-ends analysis, the Lingle Court made clear that the
two questions that will now guide regulatory takings law are the "magni-
tude or character of the burden a particular regulation imposes on upon pri-
of substantive due process into the body of regulatory takings law. The Court very self-consciously un-
dertook the conceptual decoupling not only of the verbal formulation articulated in Agins, but also of the
underlying origins of that test in substantive due process. Having done so, it is hard to imagine the
Court tolerating a revival of the very same inquiry under the guise of Penn Central's open-ended analy-
sis.
John Echeverria has argued that after Lingle, the relative importance of a governmental purpose ac-
tually belongs at the center of the Penn Central test, albeit in terms of the generality of a regulation. See
Echeverria, supra note 28, at 204-07. Echeverria notes that Lingle precludes reincorporating into Penn
Central the very due process norms that Lingle rejected, but argues that generality and average reciproc-
ity of advantage provide a means to weigh the benefits of governmental action against the harm to a
claimant. Id.
193 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540.
194 Id. at 543.
195 See Barros, supra note 10, at 355 (discussing Lingle's impact on Penn Central); Fenster, supra
note 11, at 24. The Court, at times, has invoked the Penn Central "character" factor as a jurisprudential
hook to strike down regulations that it viewed as interfering with property rights in some extreme or
"extraordinary" fashion. See, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987). This approach may sur-
vive Lingle if viewed not as a means-ends fit test, but rather as a guard against particularly bizarre dep-
rivations (regardless of the justification) of sufficiently specified property rights (such as the right of
inheritance at issue in Hodel).
196 See, e.g., Gove v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Chatham, 831 N.E.2d 865, 870-71 (Mass. 2005)
(recognizing that Lingle eliminates inquiries under the Takings Clause into the relationship between a
regulation and legitimate state interests, relegating such questions to traditional, deferential due process
review).
Although Lingle excised means-ends analysis, it is not technically accurate to say that Lingle entirely
separated the law of takings from due process. Cf Karkkainen, supra note 50, at 878-82 (discussing the
roots of the incorporation of the Takings Clause into the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause).
The fact that the bulk of regulatory takings challenges involve state and local governments means that
most jurisprudence in the area will continue to be a species of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process. As
with most areas of incorporation, however, the Court has evinced no nominal distinction between the
substance of Fifth Amendment Takings Clause law as applied to the federal government and Fourteenth
Amendment takings law as applied to state and local government. But cf Stewart E. Sterk, The Federal-
ist Dimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L.J. 203, 251-56 (2004) (noting that the
Court has never struck down a state or local law under Penn Central, but it has struck down, on more
than one occasion, federal legislation under the same test). So, while Lingle clearly excised a means-
ends test derived from due process precedents, the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause will
continue to be the primary vehicle for regulatory takings.
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vate property rights" and how the "regulatory burden is distributed among
property owners." '197 Lingle thus makes clear that regulatory takings claims
will now center, in the terms of this Article, on functional equivalence and
equality norms. The muting of the former theme, however, gives much
greater room for the latter one--equality-to come to the fore.
As a doctrinal matter, then, most regulations will be evaluated under
Penn Central, and Penn Central will increasingly turn on a comparative
fairness inquiry into the distribution of burdens, the generality of the regula-
tion, or the average reciprocity of advantage. The Penn Central analysis is
steadily narrowing. Accordingly, "economic harm to the claimant," even
serious "interference with distinct investment-backed expectations" ' short
of an injury that gives rise to per se liability, and nonpermanent physical
occupancy will increasingly be evaluated by resort to equality norms.199
This logical structure has already begun to inform the approaches of
some lower courts to recent regulatory takings claims. In Cienega Gardens
v. United States,"' for example, the Court of Federal Claims recognized that
after Lingle, "the magnitude, character, and distribution of the burdens at-
tendant" to regulation play a critical role in evaluating claims under the
Takings Clause."' The Cienega Gardens court found a taking in the gov-
ernment's restriction of certain rights under affordable housing programs,
emphasizing that the statute being challenged imposed on participants in
these programs burdens that were, in the court's view, disproportionate. 2
In Brace v. United States,"3 the Court of Federal Claims rejected a
challenge under the Takings Clause to an EPA enforcement action related
197 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542 (emphasis omitted); see Baron, supra note 11, at 638-44.
198 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538-39.
199 See supra text accompanying notes 163-69. One response to this analysis is that after Lingle, if
a claim falls outside of the "per se" categories or does not involve an exaction, the claim will simply fail.
In other words, as a practical matter, Penn Central is a dead letter. Cf Richard J. Lazarus, The Measure
of a Justice: Justice Scalia and the Faltering of the Property Rights Movement Within the Supreme
Court, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 759, 823-24 (2006) (stating that recent decisions, including Lingle, reinforce
the pattern that if there is no per se taking then Penn Central analysis is unlikely to find a taking); The
Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Leading Cases: Public Use-Economic Development, 119 HARV. L. REV.
287, 293 n.59 (2005) (noting that in practice, applications of the Penn Central test generally result in
upholding the challenged regulation).
Claims under Penn Central, however, continue to succeed. See, e.g., Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v.
United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 527, 532-37 (2007); Omaha Pub. Power Dist. v. United States, 69 Fed. Cl.
237, 241-243 (2005); Pulte Land Co. v. Alpine Township, Nos. 259759, 261199, 2006 WL 2613450, at
*3-6 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2006). More fundamentally, the Court has given no indication that it is
ready to abandon Penn Central and every indication to the contrary: that it views the Penn Central
framework as a meaningful basis on which to challenge the regulation of property.
200 67 Fed. Cl. 434 (2005).
201 Id. at 466.
202 See id. at 467 ("Congress's decision to enact the preservation statutes targeting specific property
owners of low-income housing who had rights to prepay and exit the program, and not all owners of
rental properties or all taxpayers, raises a concern under the Takings Clause.").
203 72 Fed. Cl. 337 (2006).
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to an attempt to drain and fill wetlands' °4 Important to the court's conclu-
sion was its view of the regulations at issue as "generally applicable to all
similarly situated owners and in no way.., directed at plaintiffs. 205 Simi-
larly, the North Dakota Supreme Court in Wild Rice River Estates, Inc. v.
City of Fargo26 rejected a takings claim in part because of the trial court's
findings that the claimant's development was not singled out by a morato-
rium, that other developments had been affected as well, and that no pay-
ment had been made to other developers. 7
Cienega Gardens, Brace, and Wild Rice River involved robust equality
inquiries, and these cases are not alone °.2 8 Thus, as a descriptive matter, the
equality dimension of regulatory takings law is already surfacing. It is im-
possible to predict with any accuracy the full development of the law in an
area as protean as regulatory takings, but a nascent trend is evident. Nor-
matively, however, the trend raises significant theoretical and doctrinal
problems. The same tensions that Lingle resolved with respect to substan-
tive due process will inevitably arise with equal protection.
III. THE PROBLEM OF EQUALITY
The emerging equality dimension in regulatory takings law is almost
certain to garner broad support, as evidenced by both the Court's repeated
invocation of the Armstrong test as the fundamental purpose of the regula-
tory takings regime' o9 and the near-universal scholarly endorsement of this
approach.2"' This Part argues that this embrace of the equality dimension in
regulatory takings jurisprudence is fundamentally mistaken.
Privileging norms of equality in regulatory takings raises three closely
related problems. First, it engrafts political process rationales for height-
ened scrutiny onto groups defined solely by the differential burden of a
regulation. Equally troubling is the resulting inverted political economy of
regulatory takings claims: the greatest judicial protection is provided to
204 Id. at 339, 358.
205 Id. at 356.
206 705 N.W.2d 850 (N.D. 2005).
207 Id. at 858.
208 See, e.g., Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 734 N.W.2d 623, 632-33 (Minn. 2007) (a
state takings case applying the Penn Central framework, citing Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S.
528, 538-39 (2005), for the proposition that "the primary focus of the inquiry is on 'the severity of the
burden that government imposes upon private property rights' and focusing the "character of the gov-
ernmental action" prong on the distribution of burdens question); CCA Assocs. v. United States, 75 Fed.
Cl. 170, 188-89 (2007) (incorporating Armstrong into the "character of the governmental action" in-
quiry under Penn Central); Giovanella v. Conservation Comm'n of Ashland, 857 N.E.2d 451, 462
(Mass. 2006) (focusing on singling out as a factor in the Penn Central analysis).
209 See, e.g., Lingle, 544 U.S. at 536-37.
210 As noted, scholars have provided justification for the primacy of equality norms from a political
process perspective and out of concerns about distributional fairness. See generally supra Part I.C. For
exceptions, see infra Part III.C.
102:1 (2008)
HeinOnline  -- 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 37 2008
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
those most able to protect themselves through the political system. Finally,
from a doctrinal perspective, an overly robust equality doctrine housed in
the Takings Clause is inherently indeterminate, with no content independent
of what rationality review under the Equal Protection Clause would pro-
vide. Carving out a subset of ordinary economic and social regulation for
equality-based heightened scrutiny under the Takings Clause thus threatens
to warp not only the fabric of takings but also the fabric of equal protection.
This Part reviews these claims and then argues for situating the con-
cerns addressed by the equality dimension of regulatory takings in the equal
protection jurisprudence as clearly as the Lingle Court reconciled regulatory
takings and substantive due process.
A. Against Distributional Conceptual Severance
A body of law that has traditionally focused on the impact of a regula-
tion on a property owner may involve some comparative analysis, but it
does not inherently reveal anything about the political process that led to
the disparity.2 1' Notwithstanding, one central theoretical justification for
judicial scrutiny of the differential burdens of regulation is a public choice
view of regulatory takings law. As discussed above, this justification fo-
cuses on structural failures in the political process to identify classes of
property holders for heightened judicial protection under regulatory takings
law.2"2 These theories parallel Justice Stone's process-failure rationale for
protecting discrete and insular minorities in United States v. Carolene Prod-
ucts's footnote four213-a structure that still stands at the center of equal
protection doctrine, despite much judicial and scholarly second-guessing.2 14
One difficulty with transferring this political process frame from equal
protection to regulatory takings, however, is that such arguments transform
uneven burden alone into the relevant trigger for judicial protection. This
211 See Fenster, supra note 11, at 24.
212 See supra text accompanying notes 142-53.
213 See 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
214 See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REv. 713 (1985) (argu-
ing for a reappraisal of Carolene Products in light of modem pluralist politics); Daniel A. Farber &
Philip P. Frickey, Is Carolene Products Dead? Reflections on Affirmative Action and the Dynamics of
Civil Rights Legislation, 79 CAL. L. REv. 685 (1991) (critiquing footnote four's protection of discrete
and insular minorities as applied to racial distinctions); see also Felix Gilman, The Famous Footnote
Four: A History of the Carolene Products Footnote, 46 S. TEX. L. REv. 163, 179 (2004) (arguing that
Carolene Products's footnote four was animated originally not by political process concerns but rather
by a substantive preference for personal freedoms over economic rights). Equal protection doctrine
nominally continues to draw categories of claims-some worthy of heightened scrutiny and some sub-
ject as a default matter to deferential review. That such nominal categorization is unstable in many in-
stances does not change the endurance of the basic structure.
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method of identifying a group singled out by regulation is, to coin a phrase,
distributional conceptual severance.215 Margaret Radin has noted that:
delineating a property interest consisting of just what the government action
has removed from the owner, and then asserting that that particular whole
thing has been permanently taken .... hypothetically or conceptually "severs"
from the whole bundle of rights just those strands that are interfered with by
the regulation, and then hypothetically or conceptually construes those strands
in the aggregate as a separate whole thing.216
Defining an interest group based on the existence of disparate burden em-
ploys the same conceptual strategy in the arena of political process. In
other words, identifying a group of property owners for the purpose of as-
serting political process failure solely based upon differential effects on
their property interests is plain circularity: it carves out the existence of
regulation itself as dispositive, slicing the conceptual polity by the very
regulation that is being challenged.217
To apply this rationale to takings law requires isolating structural con-
ditions that inhere in a class of property owners that suggest that the politi-
cal failure a member of the group is challenging at a given level of
government cannot be corrected by the ordinary give-and-take of politics
over time."'8 Discerning such structural conditions is a task courts are insti-
tutionally ill-suited to undertake. The search for defensible indicia of proc-
ess failure in this context risks devolving into broad generalizations
(logrolling can occur more easily in diverse cities than in homogenous sub-
urbs, for example). For every instance of an identifiable and burdened
group-Fischel's inelastic suburbanites, say, or Farber's unusually politi-
cally vulnerable owners-one can point to similarly burdened economic ac-
tors faced with similar political processes who are denied heightened
scrutiny as a matter of course. The set of tools available to the judiciary is
simply not capable of making the fine-grained evaluations of political proc-
ess necessary to give life to this approach to equality under the Takings
Clause.
Moreover, unlike some categorizations that traditionally trigger height-
ened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, such as distinctions based
on race and gender, the class of "differentially burdened property holders"
215 "Conceptual severance" in takings law, as noted, see supra notes 157-60; see also supra note
42, ordinarily refers to the problem, which can be traced to Mahon, that assessing a regulation's impact
on property rights requires a delineation of the baseline against which such impact is to be evaluated,
asking what relevant "property" interests are impacted.
216 See Radin, Liberal Conception, supra note 54, at 1676.
217 To continue the analogy to the denominator problem, one has to begin with an external referent
for the structure of the political process to which a subset of participants is uniquely disadvantaged.
218 See Rose, supra note 39, at 583-84 ("The typical logrolling legislature will pass legislation
benefiting some interests now and other interests later .... [O]ver the long run every interest in this po-
litical market will get a slice of the pie .... Of course, the logrolling process may not work because ...
some particular interest may be permanently frozen out of the chance to trade.").
102:1 (2008)
HeinOnline  -- 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 39 2008
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
is entirely malleable."9 An important conceptual grounding for nondeferen-
tial judicial review on political process grounds is that certain characteris-
tics that define membership in a group are "immutable.""22 Although the
proposition is assailable,22 ' immutability and the inability to choose relevant
characteristics for legislative line-drawing are generally thought to be im-
portant aspects of political vulnerability.222 In the equality dimension of
regulatory takings law, not only are the boundaries of the relevant classifi-
cations that give rise to group membership mutable, but such boundaries are
set by the existence of the regulation itself. Owners can thus, by dint of
challenging a differential burden, create a characteristic on which to lay a
claim. This is a difficult grounding for judicial intervention.
For the bulk of claims that might fall under a takings-equality analysis,
the Equal Protection Clause would mandate review that presumes a func-
tioning political process, generally policing against irrational classifica-
tions.223  Only where governmental action implicates invidious
discrimination or creates classifications that burden fundamental rights (but
not, to be certain, some abstract right to "property") is that presumption
overcome.224 Courts' reluctance to peer into the political process when a
law's only purported vice is imperfection in line-drawing is critical in pre-
serving the appropriate judicial role.225 The Court has refused to draw arti-
219 Race, gender, and other examples of characteristics giving rise to heightened scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause are malleable in their own ways as well, but not nearly at the same basic defini-
tional level of group identity as groups identified by differential regulatory burdens.
220 See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
221 See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Ar-
gument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 508-09 (1994).
222 See, e.g., Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686 (discussing the relationship between the political marginali-
zation of women in the political arena and the need for more judicial protection).
223 In one example of the leap to forms of nondeferential review, David Westbrook has argued from
an administrative law perspective that the "echoes" of equal protection rhetoric in takings jurisprudence
may require compensation when the enforcement of a regulation discriminates "among parties who have
equally worthy claims." Westbrook, supra note 26, at 768; see also id. at 764-68 (discussing equal pro-
tection concerns in takings jurisprudence more generally).
224 Thus, in conventional equal protection jurisprudence, only two categories are reserved for spe-
cial judicial scrutiny: where legislative line-drawing infringes on the exercise of fundamental rights or
where that line-drawing classifies based upon illegitimate criteria. See 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN
E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 216-19 (3d ed. 1999).
To ground heightened judicial review for differential burdens on the holding of property interests would
be to say that such differential burdens involve a fundamental right (presumably the fact of ownership
itself) or that line-drawing based on property is inherently illegitimate.
225 As Dean Treanor has pointed out, most takings process theorists "believe that courts should de-
fer to the decisions made by the majoritarian political process about regulation and compensation, ex-
cept in those cases in which reason exists to suspect process failure." Treanor, supra note 108, at 1157;
see also Treanor, supra note 18, at 877 (noting that applying an Armstrong-based view "puts the Court
in the position that the majoritarian decisionmaker would occupy if it were not for process failure"). If
that is the case, then the question becomes whether the political process failures that might attach to the
regulation of property under the Takings Clause are somehow conceptually different than the types of
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ficial lines to evaluate the impact of regulation on the physical and temporal
aspects of property. 26  It makes just as little sense for the Court to create
categories for heightened review based on an artificial line drawn by the
comparative effect of governmental action.
B. The Inverted Political Economy of Regulatory Takings
Privileging the equality dimension of regulatory takings law also risks
inverting the political economy of the doctrine. Prevailing political process
theories for nondeferential review under the Equal Protection Clause all
share one common theme: protecting groups uniquely or particularly disen-
franchised by the political process. 227  A robust equality-based regulatory
takings doctrine, however, protects very different sectors of society.
By definition, focusing on the distribution of burdens to property own-
ers tends to elevate the claims of those with relatively greater assets to pro-
tect.2 8  Courts can focus on the incentives facing concentrated interest
groups vying against diffused interests, 229 or on the ability of certain groups
to engage in long-term logrolling,23' as ways to distinguish classes of prop-
erty holders treated more or less fairly in the political process. Inevitably,
however, a regulatory takings doctrine that privileges those with more re-
sources will tend to give greater judicial solicitude to those who have the
means to participate in the political process. This is not to assert across the
board that wealth or assets equal political power, a proposition that is cer-
tainly not going to be true in all instances. 3' Notwithstanding, it is hard to
deny a connection between economic resources and means other than judi-
political process failures that the superstructure of equal protection law already guards against. The an-
swer is surely no.
226 See supra Part II.A (discussing the Court's rejection of conceptual severance).
227 See Treanor, supra note 18, at 873-77 (discussing the intersection of process theory and protec-
tion for discrete and insular minorities under Carolene Products).
228 "Burdens" here refers to the specific economic impact of a regulation on an individual's assets.
In this sense, the more assets an individual has, the more likely it is that an otherwise neutral restriction
on property burdens that individual. There are alternative ways, however, to consider the burden of re-
strictions on property. An individual with fewer total assets may face a relatively larger burden from a
nominally uniform regulation as a question of total resources. A general regulation may also differen-
tially impact an individual's subjective valuation of and connection to the property. And differential re-
liance may translate the effects of an otherwise general regulation into a unique harm for a given
individual. These alternative conceptions of regulatory burden are important, but the kind of compara-
tive analysis inherent in questions of regulatory generality, reciprocity of advantage, and general fairness
will much more likely focus on aspects of property holding that are more easily cognizable by courts-
those interests that are, essentially, fairly concrete or monetizable.
229 See supra text accompanying note 143.
230 See supra text accompanying note 142.
231 Although it is an easier argument to see that those with greater assets will almost certainly have
greater access to the judicial process.
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cial intervention to compete fairly in the political process, and any process-
based theory of equality must reflect that connection. 32
No rigorous study of the regulatory takings claimants has been under-
taken, although what analysis has been done tends to underscore the com-
parative advantages of typical plaintiffs in such cases.233 Even a brief
review of leading regulatory takings cases, with appropriate caution against
making general empirical claims, suggests a pattern.234
Take Lingle as a case in point. The Hawaii rent control statute struck
down by the lower courts in that case had been challenged by Chevron
U.S.A. Inc., an entity that could hardly be said to lack political power at the
local, state, or national level. 35 Similarly, the titular Tahoe-Sierra Preserva-
tion Council, Inc. was an association representing 2000 landowners seeking
to protect their right to build permanent, retirement, or vacation homes in
the ecologically sensitive and highly sought-after Lake Tahoe region.236
Anthony Palazzolo of Palazzolo was an investor in a company that had
been seeking to develop a subdivision of eighty lots.237 David Lucas of Lu-
cas was likewise extensively involved in developing South Carolina's Isle
of Palms, before his building plans ran afoul of the state's Beachfront Man-
agement Act.23 And even the Penn Central Transportation Company,
which was experiencing significant financial difficulties at the time of Penn
Central, nonetheless had significant assets in midtown Manhattan and
232 Relative wealth should not militate against the ability to invoke constitutional rights, of course,
but potential distributional consequences of process-based theories of judicial intervention under the
Takings Clause bear noting nonetheless. Antimajoritarian justifications for judicial intervention have
certainly long been connected to the possibility that property holders can constitute a minority unable to
compete in the political process in some instances. As noted, however, such justifications must account
for the long-term ability of such interest holders to respond to short-term process failures.
233 See, e.g., F. Patrick Hubbard et al., Do Owners Have a Fair Chance of Prevailing Under the Ad
Hoc Regulatory Takings Test of Penn Central Transportation Company?, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
F. 121, 141 (2003) (analyzing cases citing Penn Central and identifying the significant assets often in-
volved); Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in the Federal Courts, 48 VAND. L.
REv. 1, 41-44 (1995) (describing typical takings claimants); William J. Patton, Comment, Affirmative
Relieffor Temporary Regulatory Takings, 48 U. PITT. L. REv. 1215, 1216-17 (1987) (same).
234 To reiterate, this is not to assert a statistically significant claim. The data and bias problems in-
herent in any sample represented by reported decisions would render most attempts at such analysis near
impossible. And focusing on Supreme Court cases-generally litigated by those with the most at
stake-yields a somewhat skewed perspective. The point of this discussion, however, is primarily that a
general pattern from those suits most vigorously pursued-those that yield leading decisions-is clear.
235 Although this is not necessarily dispositive of political capital, Chevron's financial capital places
it among the world's top companies. In 2006, for example, Chevron (Chevron U.S.A. Inc.'s parent) had
sales and other operating revenues of $204.9 billion, making it the second-largest integrated energy
company in the United States based on market capitalization. See Chevron Fact Sheet, Mar. 2007,
http://www.chevron.com/news/media/docs/chevron fact-sheet.pdf.
236 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 312-13
(2002).
237 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 613 (2001).
238 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1008 (1992).
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throughout the northeastern states.239 Again, this is not to argue that regula-
tory takings claims are unavailable to or have not been availed by those
with relatively little property to protect,240 but given that the baseline for a
viable regulatory takings claim generally requires significant property to
protect, such cases are more likely to be outliers. 4'
The political economy of a robust equality dimension in regulatory tak-
ings law stands in sharp contrast to the patterns often seen in the direct ex-
ercise of eminent domain. It is important not to overshadow the many
valuable uses of eminent domain with the history of the abuse of the
power.242 Such abuses, however, ring tragically down through the history of
eminent domain, most notably during the urban renewal waves of the 1950s
and 1960s.2143 The same cannot be said for the invocation of the Takings
Clause to challenge ordinary economic and social regulation-laws that
paradigmatically (if admittedly unevenly at times) "adjust[] the benefits and
burdens of economic life to promote the common good."2
In short, not only does distributional conceptual severance undermine
any political process justification for a robust equality-based takings doc-
239 The story of the Penn Central Transportation Company, from Penn Central, is one of an eco-
nomically and at one time politically powerful claimant, although it is a complex tale. The company,
which upon its formation, fiom the merger of the Pennsylvania Railroad and the New York Central Rail-
road in 1962, had inherited 40,000 miles of track in sixteen states and the District of Columbia and Can-
ada, went through a process of phenomenal decline. In 1970, the company collapsed, leading to the
largest bankruptcy in U.S. history and the eventual federal organization of the Consolidated Railroad
Company (Conrail) in 1976 to take over Penn Central and portions of six other northeastern railroad
companies. See Penn Central Transportation Company (New York Central, Pennsylvania, and Long
Island Railroads): Records, 1796-1986, at 7 (comp. Richard Salvato, New York Public Library, Hu-
manities and Social Sciences Library, Manuscripts and Archives Division, 2006), available at
http://www.nypl.org/research/chss/spe/rbk/faids/penncentral.pdf.
240 See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987) (suit on behalf of children of low-income
mothers).
241 It could also be argued that any strong property protection-not just one grounded in compara-
tive burden-inherently offers greater protection to those with greater assets to protect. That may be
true, but a comparative inquiry tends to give relatively greater weight to the differential impact that an
otherwise general regulation has on those with more property to protect.
242 See Byrne, supra note 14, at 132 (discussing the importance of eminent domain to local govern-
ments). For an overview of the value of eminent domain in the contemporary redevelopment context,
see Marc B. Mihaly, Public-Private Redevelopment Partnerships and the Supreme Court: Kelo v. City
of New London, in THE SUPREME COURT AND TAKINGS: FOUR ESSAYS, supra note 11, at 41.
243 Postwar urban renewal-with eminent domain as a central tool-often targeted disadvantaged
communities under the banner of fighting blight. See generally Pritchett, supra note 14. In Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35-36 (1954), the Court upheld the use of eminent domain in just such a project
against a public use challenge. Urban renewal at the time often proceeded with little regard for the dis-
tributional consequences of the upheavals caused by such exercises of eminent domain. Concerns about
the unequal application of the power of eminent domain remain active. See David A. Dana, The Law
and Expressive Meaning of Condemning the Poor after Kelo, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 365 (2006), 101 Nw.
U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 5 (2006), http://www.law.northwestem.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2006/2/.
244 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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trine, but the resulting political economy privileges those classes least in
need of extraordinary judicial protection.
C Fairness and the Indeterminacy of Equality-Based Takings
A final, and equally fundamental, problem of equality in regulatory
takings is that the emerging approach threatens to inject significant incoher-
ence into the jurisprudence. 45 Despite the equality dimension's common-
sense appeal to basic fairness, any framework for deciding when an uneven
burden transgresses the border between "fair" and "unfair" will inevitably
digress into a question of the rationality of the line-drawing exercise, an in-
quiry ill-suited for the Takings Clause.
To begin, the Court's precedents yield precious little insight through
which to infer the content of this new jurisprudence. Although equality
norms have been recurring background tropes in the doctrine,246 the Court
has never treated the Armstrong principle, questions of the generality of a
regulation, or average reciprocity of advantage as dispositive or even as a
sufficiently significant focus of analysis to yield discemable principles. 47
The text of the Fifth Amendment likewise provides no guidance to give
form to an equality-based conception of regulatory takings law.24
Similarly, theoretical justifications for equality approaches to regula-
tory takings do not yield a workable focus. Formal equality, for example,
seems promising at first. It would require only that "like" property owners
be treated alike249-what would seem to be the bare minimum of protection
afforded by any conception of equality under law. Formal equality as a fo-
cus for challenges to restrictions on property, however, begs a number of
basic questions. Determining which property holders should be the basis
for comparison, for example, requires the same kind of line-drawing exer-
cise as political process justifications for intrusive judicial review, and is
likely to prove as elusive. Equally challenging is finding a neutral metric to
245 Cf Baron, supra note 11, at 642-43 (noting that Lingle's reformulation of regulatory takings
doctrine to focus on the distribution of burdens leaves such distributional questions indeterminate);
Rubenfeld, supra note 19, at 1136-39 (discussing the incoherence of equality norms under the Compen-
sation Clause); Underkuffler, supra note 28, at 747-48 (discussing the jurisprudential indeterminacy of
invocations-often based on Armstrong--of"fairness" and "justice" in takings cases).
246 See supra Part I.C.1.
247 Perhaps the best that can be said is that Justices have invoked Armstrong and its variants in order
to validate some ill-defined sense of general fairness. Cf Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In
Search of Underlying Principles Part l-Takings as Intentional Deprivations of Property Without Un-
derlying Moral Justification, 78 CAL. L. REv. 53, 85-87, 161-62 (1990) (discussing the general role of
moral intuitions in the law of takings).
248 See Fee, supra note 13, at 1042.
249 See Kent Greenawalt, How Empty is the Idea of Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1167, 1168
(1983) (arguing that the formal principle of equality holds only that "equals should be treated equally").
John Fee's articulation of formal and substantive equality in the takings clause distinguishes more nar-
rowly between generality (formal equality) and equality of outcome (substantive equality). Fee, supra
note 13, at 1050.
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calculate an acceptable distribution of burdens °.2 " Any such distribution
will not be fair in terms of strict mathematical reciprocity, in the short run
or the long run, and all too often the legal system evaluates regulatory harm
with little or no consideration of regulatory benefit.25' Formal equality thus
risks becoming a tool to police arbitrary lines-a regulation burdening one
person is presumptively invalid, but, under the right circumstances, perhaps
not.
252
The instinct to focus on equal treatment is certainly important. Simply
because judicially manageable standards for formal equality are challenging
to divine does not mean that there should be no avenue to seek review of
the distribution of regulatory burdens. In the review of ordinary social and
economic regulation, however, finding the line between appropriate and in-
appropriate burden distributions is a task that should be entrusted to the ju-
diciary only with great caution. Once the question becomes how wide a
gap between benefit and burden the judiciary will tolerate or how "general"
a law must be to pass constitutional muster, the only justifiable metric is ra-
tionality, and there is no inherent reason to prefer judicial to regulatory or
legislative institutions in drawing that line.253
Beyond formal equality, a freestanding equality inquiry in regulatory
takings law might be guided by some vision of substantive equality. Justice
as equality is a mainstay of the philosophical discourse of property more
generally.254 Perhaps ideals of strict equality or conceptions of equality of
250 The question of how to measure costs and benefits accurately or sufficiently is a task that has
long eluded courts in the context of regulatory takings.
251 A crucial conceptual problem in considering reciprocity and the distribution of burdens is how
(and whether) to account for the benefits of public action in the first place. Although the concept of im-
plicit compensation for a given claimant is often incorporated into discussions of the evaluation of the
impact of regulation, see supra notes 118-26, accounting for diffused benefits seems more often than
not simply to fall out of the equation. See WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS: LAND VALUE CAPTURE AND
COMPENSATION 17 (Donald G. Hagman & Dean J. Misczynski eds., 1978). For a discussion of gov-
ernmental interventions that increase property value, see Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Giv-
ings, I ll YALE L.J. 547 (2001). See also Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J. 1489 (1999) (discussing
the general problem of legal responses to value not attributable to "work, planning, or other productive
activities"). The point here is not that the benefits of regulation immunize governmental action from
judicial review based on the burdens of such regulation. Rather, the point is that "givings" (or windfalls,
in certain circumstances) inexorably complicate any attempt to calculate strict reciprocity. See Dagan,
supra note 13, at 771-73 (discussing long-term reciprocity and social responsibility).
252 Cf Arctic King Fisheries, Inc. v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 360, 372-73 (2004) (in rejecting a
Takings Clause claim based on "singling out" in the failure to confer a benefit, the court noted the perils
of using the Takings Clause as a means to evaluate the rationality of legislative line-drawing).
253 Cf Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537, 580-81 (1982) (discussing
the fallacy of the independent norm in discussions of equality in law). It is not that equality is inherently
indeterminate, but divining a line between permissible and impermissible burdens in reviewing legal
rules that do not involve invidious classifications or fundamental rights is an exercise of judgment for
which courts have no clear metric other than rationality.
254 For an excellent canvass and synthesis of approaches to equality in the philosophy of property,
see STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 227-53 (1990).
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opportunity,255 for example, might conceivably be pushed to provide some
guidance. Or a just-share theory or libertarian perspective might provide a
workable framework, although one that might invalidate most restrictions
on property rights that did not carry explicit or implicit offsetting benefit.
And, as noted, some theorists have argued for fairness in regulatory takings
in progressive distributional terms.256
Whatever the substantive frame that courts would use to divine the
content of the equality dimension, however, the exercise would essentially
represent the privileging of property protection through regulatory takings.
As Kent Greenawalt has noted, "substantive principles of equality" '257 turn
on conceptions of the fundamentality of the comparative interests involved.
Substantive equality thus yields propositions such as "'racial differences
should be considered irrelevant." 258 Under this framework, a robust equal-
ity-based regulatory takings doctrine makes the holding of property the sub-
stantive ground for equality. A substantive equality principle that privileges
property holding as the deciding criterion thus elevates property as such to
the level of the most central aspects of free speech, liberty, human dignity,
and other fundamental rights.259 After Lingle, however, it is hard to argue
that the Court views some abstract right to "property" as fundamental in the
way that it views a variety of other individual rights.26°
There is an additional concern raised by theories that posit the Takings
Clause as a way to ensure a commitment to distributional fairness. Apply-
ing the Takings Clause to restrict the scope of governmental action risks
standing as a barrier to such egalitarianism. Indeed, the more rigorous a
comparative inquiry into distributional burdens regulatory takings law em-
bodies, the more the law begins to serve as an explicit check on policies that
can be perceived as redistributive. 61 In some sense, all public intervention
into private ordering is redistributive, intentionally or not. One need not
accept the more cynical implications of a view of politics as an arena for
rent seeking to acknowledge that almost any policy is going to yield some
winners and some losers. A zoning code that for valid reasons separates in-
dustrial from residential uses can always leave some owners with restric-
255 Seeid. at 227-41.
256 See supra text accompanying notes 134-37.
257 Greenawalt, supra note 249, at 1168.
258 Id.
259 Cf C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA.
L. REv. 741 (1986) (arguing for a distinction between constitutional protection for economic and prop-
erty rights versus activities such as speech, procreation, and association, which receive stronger constitu-
tional protection). The Court's approach to such fundamental rights is not always consistent, uniform,
or otherwise jurisprudentially coherent. Heightened scrutiny of regulation under the Takings Clause
based on equality norms nonetheless has the potential to elevate the holding of property as such to the
category of claims that the Court has found to merit-in a variety of ways-close judicial supervision.
260 See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
261 Cf Rose, supra note 39, at 581-82.
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tions on their property that may seem to benefit one part of a community at
the expense of another (and each part may feel the same about the other).
This problem is even more acute where policies have an explicitly redis-
tributive tinge, attempting to alleviate inequality. As Hanoch Dagan's read-
ing of the distributional premises of the libertarian perspective suggests,262
the more that the law of takings reinforces the view that the only legitimate
regulation is one that provides a return equal to what is lost, the harder it
becomes for society to take inequality into account.263
Moreover, the anti-egalitarianism of privileging equality in regulatory
takings law has a potentially troubling cultural resonance. Returning to
Frank Michelman's link between perceptions of majority misrule and de-
moralization,2" strengthening a role for regulatory takings jurisprudence as
a bulwark of reciprocity between the benefits and burdens of economic life
risks reinforcing the disaffection that comes from a vision of property
predicated on such accounting. 265 The more a legal system builds the ex-
pectation that property rules exist to reify existing entitlements, the more
that expectation may become the baseline against which the validity of col-
lective action is judged, and the harder it might become for the political sys-
tem to respond to emerging exigencies.266 This kind of negative feedback
loop is hardly what Michelman seems to have contemplated when he identi-
fied the psychology of demoralization from the risk of public intervention
in property rights.267 It is a possible consequence nonetheless.
Ultimately, there is clear tension on a basic conceptual level between
the kind of comparative analysis inherent in the equality dimension of regu-
latory takings law-whether formal or substantive-and the concerns at the
core of foundational understandings of the compensation requirement under
262 See supra text accompanying notes 140-41.
263 Hanoch Dagan's subtle attempt to read progressivity into the Takings Clause, see supra text ac-
companying notes 135-37, is commendable and creative. In application, however, the grounds on
which he would read a commitment to community and equality may tend toward the opposite results. A
vigorous insistence on long-term reciprocity, like process-oriented approaches, requires Herculean as-
sumptions about the nature of the interests involved and the capacity of any institution-judicial or leg-
islative-to calibrate such lines.
264 See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
265 Cf Sax, supra note 126 (discussing the importance to modem property rights activism of per-
ceptions of comparative unfairness between owners of developed and undeveloped property).
266 Thus, the more the legal system bases its protection of property on a certain set of expecta-
tions-on avoiding the "special kind of suffering" that arises from a "feeling" of being the "victim[] of
unprincipled exploitation," Michelman, supra note 13, at 1230-the more the legal system signals to
holders of property that existing entitlements are ineluctable. That such expectations are protected by
compensation (that is, by liability rule protection rather than property rule protection) only alters the
psychological calculus to the extent that people view their property as fungible. Put another way, if the
question devolves into the cost of the perception of distributional fairness, then differential predilections
become critical. To the extent that those with more property to protect feel that otherwise neutral regu-
lations unfairly burden them, accounting for demoralization costs (and settlement costs to the extent that
settlement costs are a function of avoiding demoralization) takes on a regressive cast.
267 Cf Farber, supra note 144, at 286.
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the Takings Clause. Hewing as closely as possible to the core of traditional
eminent domain-the Takings Clause as a defense against concrete, clear,
tangible interference with property, even if not predicated on formal trans-
fer of title-best cabins the potentially open-ended authority for which the
Takings Clause is often invoked. The focus of the equality dimension, in its
various guises, moves radically away from this core, asking not how se-
verely a regulation interferes with property, but rather whether the interfer-
ence is "fair" when compared to the burdens imposed on others.268
Given the myriad of theoretical and doctrinal problems posed by the
emerging equality dimension of regulatory takings law, the most appropri-
ate response would be to excise the theme from the jurisprudence alto-
gether. Lingle provides a model for how to do so. There, the Court held
that notwithstanding decades of confusion about the interaction between
substantive due process and regulatory takings, means-ends analysis should
be situated within the former body of law and not within the latter.269 The
Lingle Court recognized that the Takings Clause cannot carve out some
subset of regulations for heightened means-ends analysis beyond that af-
forded by deferential substantive due process review. Likewise there is no
reason why the Takings Clause should house a parallel set of conceptual
tools and judicial frames for evaluating equality norms beyond those found
under the Equal Protection Clause.27
Equal protection claims have long been brought to challenge the kinds
of varied impacts on property rights implicit in claims based on the distribu-
268 Another way to conceptualize the limits of an equality-based approach to regulatory takings is to
consider the potentially absurd results of an explicit equality approach to direct eminent domain. If the
question turned on comparative burdens or the magnitude of "singling out," then even significant expro-
priation might not yield compensation, provided the expropriation were sufficiently general. Cf.
Rubenfeld, supra note 19, at 1136 (arguing that distributional concerns are "simply orthogonal to Com-
pensation Clause analysis").
269 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005).
270 This is not to argue that equal protection jurisprudence is as strong a guard against invidious dis-
crimination as it could be (nor, indeed, itself a coherent body of law). An equality-based regulatory tak-
ings doctrine, however, is unlikely to focus on traditional suspect classifications given that the ground
for differentiation is based on the treatment of property. If it were possible to cast a regulatory takings
equality doctrine that privileged the lack of property, then there might be an overlap between regulatory
takings and traditionally disenfranchised minorities. Cf. Ball, supra note 13, at 842-51 (arguing for a
form of heightened scrutiny where governmental action constitutes a nuisance that creates a "peculiar
and substantial burden," particularly in the context of poor and minority communities). Indeed, such a
doctrine might be a way to redress the Court's unwillingness to take inequality based on economic status
seriously under the Equal Protection Clause. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1 (1973). As this Article argues, however, equality review under regulatory takings is more likely to
provide greater protection to those with more property to protect and is therefore unlikely to provide a
constitutional home for more egalitarian constitutional review.
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tion of burdens. 271  And appropriately so, given that any governmental ac-
tion can draw lines so irrational as to fail even minimal scrutiny. Clarifying
that such challenges belong under the Equal Protection Clause might yield a
less vigorous regulatory takings doctrine, just as Lingle's rejection of a
quasi-substantive due process doctrine under the Takings Clause arguably
did.272 Lingle, however, points to that direction for the doctrine.273
In short, prevailing conceptions of judicial review of ordinary regula-
tion under the Equal Protection Clause provide the most appropriate
framework through which to evaluate the distribution of regulatory burdens,
the generality of governmental action, and the underlying "fairness" from a
horizontal perspective in any interference with property rights that is less
than perfectly equal.274 In Lingle, the Court took a refreshingly candid ap-
proach to the Lochnerian perils that attend any attempt to use the Takings
Clause as a back door to judicial second-guessing of ordinary regulation. It
makes little sense to revive those perils under equality norms.275
D. Some Objections Considered
The argument for reconciling the equality dimension of regulatory tak-
ings jurisprudence with the Equal Protection Clause might engender several
271 See, e.g., County Concrete Corp. v. Township of Roxbury, 442 F.3d 159, 163, 170-71 (3d Cir.
2006); Koscielski v. City of Minneapolis, 435 F.3d 898, 901 (8th Cir. 2006); Patel v. City of Chicago,
383 F.3d 569, 573 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564-65 (2000)
(per curiam) (upholding a "class of one" equal protection challenge to an easement condition on the
granting of a connection to a municipal water supply). For an example of an early case examining equal
protection arguments along with due process and "compensation" claims, see Powell v. Pennsylvania,
127 U.S. 678 (1888).
272 See James W. Ely Jr., "Poor Relation " Once More: The Supreme Court and the Vanishing
Rights of Property Owners, 2005 CATO S. CT. REv. 39, 52 ("Lingle... perpetuates the second class
status of property rights."); see also Radford, supra note 83, at 449-50; cf Eagle, supra note 191 (advo-
cating for a revived due process analysis in the wake of Lingle to provide "meaningful scrutiny").
273 See supra text accompanying note 260.
274 A regulatory takings jurisprudence narrowed to the grounds of equivalence still gives much
breadth for recognizing the legitimate concerns of property owners where state interference with an in-
dividual's property is sufficiently severe. It is in no way necessary to discern the appropriate line for
making that determination to argue that that is a more appropriate inquiry than some ill-conceived com-
parative burden analysis.
275 Cf McUsic, supra note 16, at 631-40 (comparing and contrasting modem takings doctrine and
Lochner-era substantive due process review of economic legislation).
Reconciling equality-based themes in takings jurisprudence with the Equal Protection Clause would
have the salutary, if secondary, effect of aligning the distributional aspects of takings jurisprudence with
the constitutional law of taxation, where a variety of uneven burdens-even burdens targeted at a rela-
tively small group of property owners (as in the context of special assessments)-have been upheld by
the Court. See Eduardo Moisrs Pefialver, Regulatory Taxings, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 2182, 2193-2204
(2004) (discussing the constitutional law of taxation). Pefialver argues persuasively that tension between
the constitutional law of taxation and regulatory takings doctrine supports substantially scaling back the
latter. Id. at 2240. This is consistent with a view of regulatory takings that places concerns about equal-
ity norms within the generally deferential framework of the Equal Protection Clause.
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objections. One rejoinder might be that if the concern is institutional-that
equality norms in regulatory takings jurisprudence imply inappropriately in-
trusive judicial review-then a deferential equality principle might still
have a role to play. In other words, there is no reason why the Constitu-
tion's protection of individual rights, including property rights, cannot be
capacious enough to tolerate redundancy. After all, notions of equality un-
derlie the prohibition against bills of attainder 76 and a number of other sub-
stantive and procedural constitutional protections, 7 so why not retain the
comparative element of regulatory takings? Certainly an equality principle
that paralleled the Equal Protection Clause would be less troubling than the
kind of confusion and creeping heightened scrutiny that the application of
the Agins test over its twenty-five-year existence suggests is more likely to
emerge in the jurisprudence.
Privileging equality norms in regulatory takings law is still objection-
able, however, because it transforms the jurisprudence into a comparative
inquiry that singles out the fact of ownership-a differential burden on
holding property-as the sole ground for decision. Any other basis of line-
drawing is already cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause, and more
appropriately belongs in that jurisprudence. Properly understood, the Arm-
strong principle gets the Takings Clause exactly wrong: transforming the
Takings Clause into a tool to police against "singling out" shifts from pro-
tecting property to policing the rationality of legislative line-drawing in or-
dinary social and economic regulation, a task best served by the Equal
Protection Clause.
This argument, moreover, could be made for an independent substan-
tive due process inquiry under the Takings Clause. An equality-based view
of regulatory takings essentially imports a type of means-ends analysis into
the jurisprudence, an analysis that the Court in Lingle noted logically pre-
cedes the takings question.2" The Court, however, appropriately rejected
this kind of constitutional redundancy in its substantive due process guise.
276 See Kristin A. Collins, Federalism's Fallacy: The Early Tradition of Federal Family Law and
the Invention of States'Rights, 26 CARDOzO L. REv. 1761, 1780 (2005).
277 Notions of equality, for example, permeate constitutional criminal law. See, e.g., Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (discussing "the basic theme of equal pro-
tection... implicit in 'cruel and unusual' punishments"); see also Scott W. Howe, The Troubling Influ-
ence of Equality in Constitutional Criminal Procedure: From Brown to Miranda, Furman and Beyond,
54 VAND. L. REv. 359, 418-32 (2001) (criticizing the use of equality-based evaluations of some crimi-
nal procedure protections afforded by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments). Likewise,
equality permeates certain aspects of First Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo,
512 U.S. 43, 50-51 (1994); see generally Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First
Amendment, 43 U. CIr. L. REv. 20 (1975) (canvassing equality norms in First Amendment jurispru-
dence). And there is an equality dimension to aspects of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV and the prohibition on discrimination against interstate interests in Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 224, at 205.
278 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S 528, 543 (2005).
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The logic of Lingle applies with the same force to such redundancy in its
equality means-ends dimension.
A second objection might be that the Takings Clause is concerned
solely with compensation whereas the Equal Protection Clause involves the
more judicially blunt question of basic validity.279 Under the Takings
Clause, the argument would follow, an equality-based doctrine that paral-
leled (perhaps entirely) equal protection jurisprudence would serve a fun-
damentally different function: to divine a line between valid governmental
actions that require compensation and valid governmental actions that do
not. As John Echeverria recently argued, "[p]roperly interpreted, regulatory
takings doctrine should focus exclusively on providing financial compensa-
tion for legitimate government actions that single out one or a few property
owners for severe, disproportionate economic burdens.""28
This is an important concern. The best response that can be made is a
functional one. In practice, the Takings Clause generally has been invoked
to challenge regulation not to gain compensation, but rather to invalidate
the governmental action at issue.281 Indeed, until First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,282 it was not entirely clear that
the Takings Clause could be invoked to mandate compensation outside of
traditional eminent domain. Crafting a regulatory takings jurisprudence
that takes the fact of compensation seriously has much appeal, but mandat-
ing compensation for otherwise legitimate governmental action has not
been a serious aspect of the doctrine since its outset.283
Another problem with this objection, moreover, is distributional. Ge-
neric categories of "property holders" will not parallel those minority
groups recognized as unique victims of political process failure for equal
protection purposes. It is true that for certain "discrete and insular minori-
ties," the Equal Protection Clause is underprotective, primarily because of
the requirement of discriminatory purpose. 84 Because the Takings Clause's
279 See Boudreaux, supra note 13, at 219-20 (arguing that the remedial focus of the Takings Clause
on just compensation obviates concerns about means-ends balancing that have driven rational-basis re-
view under the Equal Protection Clause).
280 Echeverria, supra note 28, at 199. John Fee reaches a similar conclusion. See Fee, supra note
13, at 1007 ("The proper role of the Takings Clause is to require compensation in those circumstances
where the government legitimately targets merely one or a few owners to bear a unique legal burden for
the benefit of the general community.").
281 See Echeverria & Dennis, supra note 64, at 706-07; McUsic, supra note 16, at 643-44.
282 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
283 There are exceptions to the propensity of regulatory takings claims to involve the underlying va-
lidity of the legal rule at issue. "Temporary takings" in the context of restrictions that are no longer in
effect is one example. See, e.g., Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Nonetheless, as Mahon, Penn Central, and numerous other cases make clear, the question of underlying
validity has long been at the heart of regulatory takings jurisprudence.
284 This is one argument that Treanor makes in favor of a political process takings analysis. See
Treanor, supra note 18, at 876 (arguing that one advantage to a political process approach to takings law
102:1 (2008)
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focus is on preserving existing property entitlements, however, it is not the
place to remedy that problem.
A final objection might be that denuding regulatory takings law of its
equality dimension leaves owners vulnerable to extreme singling out or
regulatory action motivated by animus.85 Lucas provides an analogous
category with its justification for nominally per se takings liability where
the government obliterates all utility of ownership, however rare that might
be in practice.286 That same marginal boundary of extreme governmental
action, however, does not justify the equality dimension of regulatory tak-
ings law. Singling out so narrow as to be fundamentally irrational-again,
exceedingly unlikely to occur in practice-is more appropriately addressed
(as it already is) under equal protection jurisprudence. 87 Likewise, claims
of animus are already squarely addressed as an issue of the legitimacy of
governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause.288
CONCLUSION
In a cautious, incremental way, the Supreme Court is moving toward a
significant and beneficial clarification of regulatory takings jurisprudence.
The Court currently seems to be focused on setting forth appropriate institu-
tional roles.289 With that focus, the Court has finally begun to confront the
exceptionalism that has marked modem regulatory takings doctrine as a
particular constitutional muddle.
In the process of bringing order to the jurisprudence, the Court is ele-
vating the equality dimension of regulatory takings, a theme that, although
previously submerged in the case law, enjoys broad theoretical support. It
is no exaggeration that the Armstrong principle and its kindred doctrines en-
joy almost universal acceptance.
This Article argues, however, that an uncritical embrace of political
process and fundamental fairness rationales for focusing on the distribution
of burdens in regulatory takings is unwarranted and unwise. Such concerns
should sound not under the Takings Clause, but rather under the deferential
standards afforded by the Equal Protection Clause for the review of ordi-
nary economic and social regulation.
is the ability to address "disparate impact" claims for minority groups granted heightened scrutiny under
equal protection, but whose redress is limited by the discriminatory purpose requirement).
285 Michelman is surely correct that a unique harm arises from capricious exploitation. See
Michelman, supra note 13, at 1215; see also Baker, supra note 259, at 764-65 (discussing the harms of
invidious singling out). The relevant question is whether regulatory takings doctrine is the best avenue
to remedy that harm, and whether the risk of overinclusive policing of claims of invidious singling out
merit the approach found under the Equal Protection Clause.
286 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
287 See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (per curiam).
288 See, e.g., U.S. Dep't ofAgric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
289 See Fenster, supra note 11, at 42-51.
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Shorn of an inappropriate equality dimension, regulatory takings juris-
prudence would be narrowed to something close to the historical core of the
Takings Clause. The Takings Clause would protect against those rare in-
stances where regulation constitutes the functional equivalent of direct gov-
ernmental expropriation.290 This is still an admittedly contested conceptual
category, but a more solid grounding for the jurispradence nonetheless.
The result would be a simpler, clearer, and more egalitarian law of regula-
tory takings.
290 The Takings Clause would also, of course, continue to constrain the direct exercise of the power
of eminent domain, its original and least disputed function.
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